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Elevate the judiciary to the status of an independent power and
reinforce the prerogatives of the Constitutional Council to
enhance the primacy of the Constitution, of the rule of law and of
equality before the law.. . .' (King Mohammed VI, March 9,
2011)
1. His Majesty King Mohammed VI, Speech at Rabat, Morocco, MAP (Mar. 9, 2011),
http://www.map.ma/eng/sections/speeches/hm the king addresse_6/view (last visited Mar. 6, 2012)
(noting on the official website that the King's speech received international acclaim). See, e.g.,
Constitutional Reforms Announced by HM the King, "Model in the Region," Hillary Clinton,
MAROC.MA, http://www.maroc.ma/PortaillnstAnfemplates/Actualites.aspx?NRMODE=Published&
NRNODEGUID-%7bD48287A2-CCBF-4020-ACBE-9D7C55551ABA%7d&NRORIGINALURL=%2
fPortaillnst/o2fAn%2flogoevenementiel%2fReforns%2bannounced%2bby%2bHM%2bthe%2bKing/o2
bmake%2bMorocco%2bstronger/o2ehtm&NRCACHEHINT=NoModifyGuest (last visited Mar. 6,
2012).
In light of the fast moving changes in Morocco after the Arab Spring, the author acknowledges
that pre-Arab Spring sources need to be used with caution because of the potential change in context. In
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[I]t is necessary to boost the citizen's trust in the rule of law and
provide legal safeguards for his judicial security. This is why we
are determined to carry on with our effort to upgrade the
judiciary and preserve its independence and ethical standards.
The aim is not only to uphold rights and to right wrongs, but also
to foster a climate of trust and legal security, which will act as a
catalyst for boosting development and investment flows. I must
therefore stress again the need to put the overhauling of justice
on top of the reform agenda. This is why I urge the government
to work out a well-defined plan to revamp the judiciary.2 (King
Mohammed VI, July 30, 2008)
In general, justice in Morocco is perceived by the public to be
more of a matter of access to power [rather] than the function of
an independent and impartial rule of law system. The 2005
Public Perception of the Moroccan Judiciary described the
system as ". . . a mix of complex, disabling and crippling
proceedings that set the system against the citizen" and as "an
intimidating jungle." [T]he judiciary still suffers from persistent
complaints that it is plagued with corruption, is not independent
or accountable, does not have effective mechanisms for
enforcement, and is encumbered by delays. The public in general
lack confidence in and respect for the judicial system.' (2010
USAID-sponsored report on Morocco)
addition, this article might be complemented by a close site assessment and diagnostic of conditions in
the Moroccan judiciary which may be adjusted over time. Given the wide sweep of this article, ranging
from judicial independence to anti-corruption to illiteracy, however, even such a review of the justice
system would have its limits as a tool for assessing the problems and proposing solutions regarding
judicial reform and access to justice.
2. Full Text of HM King Mohammed VI Speech on 9th Anniversary of Throne Day, MAP
(July 30, 2008), http://www.map.malen/print/3563 (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). See also Morocco:
Justice Lacks Independence & Public Confidence, Wikileaks, MOROCCOBOARD.COM (Dec. 21, 2010),
http://www.moroccoboard.com/news/34/5005 (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) ("The dispatch pointed [out]
that the king considers judicial reform to be a priority, and listed the need of professional training of
judges in both law and ethics and concluded that without serious steps to eliminate meddling by officials
in the justice system, reform would not succeed.").
3. USAID, MOROCCO RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT 12 (2010), available at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADT305.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) [hereinafter MOROCCO RULE
OF LAW ASSESSMENT]. Although this article refers to the author of the report as USAID, the author is
stated in the report to be DPK Consulting, a contractor, for review by USAID. The sponsoring USAID
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I. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION
A. Rule ofLaw and Judicial Reform
Judicial reform has historically been an important (but not the sole)
component of rule of law reform, a decades old movement affecting the
developing world, emerging (or not so emerging) democracies and post-
conflict nations, and equally applicable to countries commonly identified as
Western, including the United States. This article addresses recent reform
efforts in Morocco, particularly through the 2011 constitutional reforms,4
initially proposed in outline by the King during the Arab Spring and drafted
by a "blue-ribbon commission,"'* to improve the Moroccan judicial system.
It also reflects on key issues underlying judicial reform, particularly judicial
independence (and impartiality); structural and behavior changes; anti-
corruption; and access to justice.
Sophisticated rule of law analysts raise the question whether programs
for improving the rule of law are effective if political will to change is
lacking; the local environment is misunderstood; and resources are
inadequate.6 (Extensive literature on the rule of law and its definitions is
office is listed as Rule of Law Division, Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID
(DCHA/DG/ROL).
4. Although the constitutional reform process itself is beyond the scope of this article, for
further information on the consultative process leading to the reforms, see Marina Ottaway, The New
Moroccan Constitution: Real Change or More of the Same?, CARNEGIEENDOWMENT.ORG (June 20,
2011), http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/20/new-moroccanconstitution-real-change-or-more-of-
same/51 (last visited Mar. 6, 2012); and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Is Morocco Immune to Upheaval,
MIDDLE E. Q., at 87-93 (Winter 2012), available at http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3114.pdf (last
visited Mar. 6, 2012). See also id. at 92-93 (noting the short time between dissemination of the
proposed constitution on June 17, 2011, and its submission to voters for approval on July 1, 2011 for a
referendum; at the referendum, 98.5% voted "yes" in favor of the constitution, representing about 73%
of the eligible voters).
5. See with respect to the drafting and redrafting process of the constitution, especially non-
public drafts of the constitution, Sarah Feuer, Self-Immolations Mar Year of Reforms in Morocco,
WASH. INST. FOR NEAR E. POL. (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
templateC05.php?CID=3445 (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) ("[D]raft constitution proposed by the blue-
ribbon commission was altered by the time it reached the public. For example, the original version
reduced the king's powers more substantially, insisted on the 'unitary' rather than 'Muslim' nature of
the state, and explicitly guaranteed individual liberties such as 'freedom of conscience'-all provisions
that were ultimately dropped."); and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, supra note 4 (noting difference between
the constitutional drafting commission's draft and final constitution).
6. See, e.g., Wade Channell, Grammar Lessons Learned: Dependent Clauses, False
Cognates, and Other Problems in Rule of Law Programming, 72 U. PITT. L. REv. 171, 171 (2010)
("[P]ositive gains, such as improved constitutions, are often offset by implementation and enforcement
failures."). See also generally CUSTOMARY JUSTICE AND RULE OF LAW IN WAR-TORN SOCIETIES
(Deborah H. Isser ed., 2011) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY JUSTICE AND RULE OF LAW]; WILLIAM
2012] Greene 459
either available elsewhere or is referenced in this article). These
considerations are only partly relevant to Morocco. The constitutional
reform efforts in Morocco that are the subject of this article are a key
indicator of political will (especially when taken together with recent or
ongoing protests); and the efforts are internally generated, not externally
sponsored. Also, Morocco's familiarity with its "local environment" may
be presumed; and, to the extent that resources are required, the issue will
depend on their availability and how Morocco prioritizes its budgets.
The article will begin with the fundamentals of a good judicial system,
analyze how the constitutional reforms move Morocco closer along that
path, address the complex concept of judicial independence, and consider
various challenges faced by Morocco on the way to achieving judicial
reform.
B. What Is a Good Judicial System: Basic Principles
Consistent with established international principles, including the
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002)7 and the United Nations
EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST'S EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO
MUCH ILL AND So LITTLE GOOD (2007).
Assessing the utility or efficacy of rule of law programming in general or in particular, although
important, is beyond the scope of this article. Cf Wade Channell, supra note 6 at 172 ("The need for
rule of law is a foregone conclusion among development practitioners. ROL is recognized as the
foundation for establishing and protecting fundamental human rights, and is increasingly understood as
an essential component for long-term, stable economic growth. Yet consistent underperformance-and
outright failure-of many programs calls into question whether external programs can positively
influence the development of rule of law. The answer is not immediately clear.") (citation omitted).
7. See Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, Bangalore Principles of Judicial
Conduct, T 1.1 (2002), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicialroup/
Bangaloreprinciples.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Bangalore Principles of Judicial
Conduct]. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct are intended to be adaptable to various
jurisdictions and provide a "framework for regulating judicial conduct." See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE
ON DRUGS AND CRIME, COMMENTARY ON THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 36
(2007), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/publicationsunodc_commentary-
e.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2012):
The statement of principles which follows, and which is based on six fundamental
and universal values, together with the statements on the application of each
principle, are intended to provide guidance to judges and to afford the judiciary a
framework for regulating judicial conduct, whether through a national code of
conduct or other mechanism. The statements on the application of each principle
have been designed not to be of so general a nature as to be of little guidance, nor
so specific as to be irrelevant to the numerous and varied issues which a judge
faces in his or her daily life. They may, however, need to be adapted to suit the
circumstances of each jurisdiction.
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Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985),8 this article
shall assume that a good judicial system involves an impartial, fair and
timely means for resolving controversies, presided over by a stranger to the
dispute (an uninvolved person),9 who is educated in, working with and
fairly applying commonly accepted rules of deciding disputes."o The
parties are represented by lawyers (or not) to help them understand the
system and present and advocate positions which may be (but need not be)
beyond their understanding. Following the decision, the parties either
accept the decision or if appeal is available, appeal to like impartial arbiters
or a commission of arbiters, and after that decision or even a subsequent
decision on appeal, they agree to accept the decision (whether it is
favorable or not), and then "go about their business" (a concept often
referenced as "legitimacy" since the parties accept a negative decision as
"legitimate")."
8. See U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 1985, hereinafter, "UN.
Basic Principles," cited at CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN LAW INITIATIVE JUDICIAL REFORM
PROGRAM, COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON JUDICIAL REFORM AND JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE 1-4 (CEELI 2004), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/docs/judicialreform-compilationinternationalstandards_2004.pdf
(last visited Aug. 25, 2012) [hereinafter COMPILATION OF INT'L STANDARDS] (Adopted by the 7th U.N.
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from August 26
through September 6, 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of November 29, 1985
and 40/146 of December 13, 1985).; also cited at UN. Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUM. RTS., available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/indjudiciary.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2012). See also Bangalore
Principles ofJudicial Conduct, supra note 7, 1 2.5.1.
9. See Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, supra note 7, 1 2.5.1 (noting that a judge
shall disqualify himself where he has personal knowledge of evidentiary facts).
10. This article assumes that the substantive law complies with modem rule of law values and
is not discriminatory, unreasonable, confiscatory or otherwise facially unjust. Whether one can have a
good judicial system in a legal system infused with substantive injustice is beyond the scope of this
article. See, e.g., Norman L. Greene et al., A Perspective on Nazis in the Courtroom, Lessons From the
Conduct of Lawyers and Judges under the Laws of the Third Reich and Vichy, France, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 1122 (1996) [hereinafter A Perspective on Nazis in the Courtroom]; Norman L. Greene et al.,
Executioners, Jailers, Slave-trappers, and the Law: What Role Should Morality Play in Judging?, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 963 (1997) [hereinafter Executioners, Jailers, Slave-trappers, and the Law].
11. See generally COMPILATION OF INT'L STANDARDS, supra note 8; UN, Basic Principles,
supra note 8. In a democratic system, such as in the United States, judicial decision-making is subject
to limits from other branches of government. Precedents established in certain decisions interpreting
legislation may be neutralized through the passage of new legislation or amendment of the legislation
interpreted, and precedents established in constitutional matters may be changed through constitutional
amendment, although the process for change may be slow or difficult. Whether a "democratic system"
can be theorized with one or more of the elements missing or modified, and whether such a system may
be deemed "democratic," is beyond the scope of this article.
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The focus here will be on so-called "formal" justice systems, and
the article takes no position on a good justice (judicial) system in a context
in which no "formal" system is practicable. Customary, informal, non-
traditional or non-state justice systems1 2 play a valuable role in many
societies and need to be fully understood since such systems may be the
best that may be achieved because of lack of capacity (including
infrastructure and other resources); lack of political or cultural will; or the
legitimacy accorded to it by the population.13
The use of the abstraction "judicial system" should not obscure its
specific elements. In addition to physical structures, technology and
records, these include businesses and individuals who have suffered losses
and need redress. The justice system can be personal, powerful, and
integrally involved with people's lives, their liberty, their property and their
family; and sometimes it is even literally or figuratively "violent."' 4  Yet
when working well, it can be an engine for economic stability, growth,
development, and, of course, justice.
12. The best term for describing non-formal systems is the subject of debate, and each term
used alone has been the subject of criticism. See CUSTOMARY JUSTICE AND RULE OF LAW, supra note 6,
at 9.
13. See, e.g., Thomas Barfield et al., The Clash of Two Goods: State and Nonstate Dispute
Resolution in Afghanistan, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, at 22 (2006), available at
http://www.usip.org/files/file/clash_twogoods.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) ("There is an inherent
tension between the goals of state-building according to international norms on one hand, and respect
for local customs and practices combined with practical requirements of sustainable development.");
CUSTOMARY JUSTICE AND RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 159, 185. See also Norman L. Greene,
Perspectives from the Rule of Law and International Economic Development: Are There Lessons for
the Reform of Judicial Selection in the United States?, 86 DENV. U. L. REv. 53, 80-81 (2008)
[hereinafter Perspectives from the Rule ofLaw]. Informal justice systems sometimes provide access to
justice in ways not possible through traditional justice systems because they do not require
transportation to distant courts and provide more rapid resolution at a lower cost. Some countries may
not have the capacity to establish a formal justice system or the time to do so, and the informal system
sometimes provides a means to fill what would otherwise be a justice sector vacuum where there is no
functioning dispute resolution process at all. See generally CUSTOMARY JUSTICE AND RULE OF LAW,
supra note 6.
14. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=3687&context=fssjpapers (last visited
Mar. 6, 2012):
Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death. This is true in several
senses. Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence
upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result,
somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.
Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for violence which has already
occurred or which is about to occur. When interpreters have finished their work,
they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn apart by these
organized, social practices of violence.
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C. The Key Elements: Independent Structure, Behavior and Education,
and Access
Improving the judicial system is partly a structural problem of creating
an independent judiciary as a separate branch of government, partly one of
civic education about what the courts are and what they are supposed to do,
partly one of establishing good governance or rules, and partly one of
addressing access to the system.
The issue of separateness is easy. If the judiciary just does the bidding
of the legislative branch or the executive branch, why have it? It would
only be redundant of the other branches of government and an expensive
and useless redundancy at that. Civic education on the role of the courts is
essential to stress the importance of impartial decision-making to enhance
the legitimacy of the courts, to adjust citizen expectations (so citizens seek
and accept impartiality rather than victory at any cost), and to ensure that
the judges understand their role as impartial arbiters.
As for the issue of governance (rules and structure), there are many
sub-issues. Which should be the rules governing the system? Are the rules
fair? Are they fairly applied by the impartial stranger? What makes and
keeps the stranger impartial and what does not? What should be done if the
stranger is not (or does not appear to be) impartial, and who makes that
final decision? What shall the code of ethics for professional conduct say?
How will breaches be detected? How will the code be enforced?
In the area of rules, progress appears to be measurable, sometimes by
the mere passage of rules, some of which are already "international
standards." But rules (even constitutional ones) are also subject to the
observation that they are only "top-down" reforms when more is needed or
just insufficient "constitutional engineering" (in essence, "word games"). 5
Therefore, even when rules are in place (such as the constitutional reforms
in Morocco), the question of implementing the rules or enforcement-
moving from "paper rules" to actual change-remains.
Setting up a fair and impartial judicial system is of limited utility,
however, unless there is access to justice so that citizens may use the
system. Relevant questions bearing on access include, for example, a mix
of educational, structural and resource issues. Among other things, these
questions include: do citizens know their rights so they know when they can
and should take their cases to court or otherwise assert their rights (a matter
15. But see John Mukum Mbaku, Constitutional Engineering and the Transition to
Democracy in Post-Cold War Afiica, INDEPENDENT REVIEW, at 501, 502 (Vol. II, No. 4, Spring 1998),
available at http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir 02_4_mbaku.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2012) ("[A]
constitution is the critical factor in any properly effected transition to more effective governance
structures.").
[Vol. 18:2462
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of particular concern where there is lack of literacy); how and in what types
of cases should legal services be expanded to make representation more
available where litigants are unable to afford it; is the court system
adequately funded so that it can handle its business efficiently and are there
sufficient and well-qualified judges to handle the cases; are there inordinate
court delays which prevent people from obtaining access; and are the courts
geographically accessible.' 6
This article will focus on progress to date in Morocco, principally on
its 2011 constitutional reforms, a number of which fully comply with
international best practices; identify some of the work remaining to be
done; provide context and perspective; and suggest some possible priorities
and approaches. Some of these suggestions will not involve more rules (or
enforcement of rules), but rather, educational or socio-economic change,
and as such, will have longer time horizons for achievement.
II. MOROCCO: BACKGROUND
Before analyzing the Moroccan judiciary, particularly in light of the
constitutional reforms, a brief sketch of Morocco is needed to understand
the context. What and where, in short, is Morocco?
A country with a diverse legal and cultural history, Morocco has a
population over 32 million and is located in close proximity to Spain on the
north (Tangier in Morocco is about twenty miles south of the Spanish
border) in the northwestern part of North Africa, bordering Algeria to the
east, with coasts on the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.'7 Islam is
the state religion (and that of the vast majority of the population), but
freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed. 8  Morocco has a
constitutional, parliamentary, and hereditary monarchy 9 and is a pluralistic,
16. For an excellent discussion of access to justice and its various elements, see Lawrence M.
Friedman, Access to Justice: Some Historical Comments, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3 (2010). The
question of access to justice is more than that of access to legal services. Moreover, legal services are
not interchangeable and are subject to variation in quality, including the extent of effort devoted to the
matter and overall competence.
17. Morocco is often referred to as being strategically located because of its geographic
positioning. See Morocco's Economic Strengths Highlighted in Washington, MOROCCO WORLD NEWS
(Oct. 11, 2011), http://moroccoworldnews.com/2011/10/moroccos-economic-strengths-highlighted-in-
washington/l 1423 (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Morocco's Economic Strengths] (referencing
event at American University sponsored by the Washington Moroccan American Club).
18. See MOROCCO CONST. art. 3 (2011) ("L'Islam est la religion de l'Etat, qui garantit A tous
le libre exercice des cultes."). [Editors' translation: "Islam is the State religion, which guarantees
everyone the freedom to worship'].
19. See MOROCCO CONST. art. 1:
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multilingual society, with many cultural strains, including with French,
Arabic, Berber (Amazigh), Andalusian, sub-Saharan, and Jewish roots, with
20Jews at one time comprising hundreds of thousands in Morocco.
The diversity of Morocco's culture is expressly recognized in its
constitution,2 1 which, among other things, acknowledges Arabic and Berber
(l'amazighe) as the country's two official languages, although French is
widely spoken, taught in schools and used in commerce and government;
Le Maroc est une monarchie constitutionnelle, d6mocratique, parlementaire et
sociale. Le rigime constitutionnel du Royaume est fond6 sur la s6paration,
I'6quilibre et la collaboration des pouvoirs, ainsi que sur la dimocratie citoyenne
et participative, et les principes de bonne gouvernance et de la corr6lation entre la
responsabilit6 et la reddition des comptes. [Editor's translation: Morocco is a
constitutional, democratic, parliamentary and social monarchy. The
constitutional system of the Kingdom is based on the separation, balance and
collaboration of powers, as well as citizenship and participatory democracy, the
principles of good governance and the correlation [or balance] between
responsibility and accountability.]
See also id. art. 42 (hereditary monarchy).
20. Among other recent celebrations of Moroccan history and culture was a symposium in
New York on 2000 years of Jewish life in Morocco, including various discussions and events, such as a
museum exhibit in New York. The event was presented by the American Sephardi Federation under the
patronage of the Kingdom of Morocco. See Norman L. Greene, Journey into Morocco's Past Through
the New York Center for Jewish History, MOROCCOBOARD NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 2, 2011),
http://www.moroccoboard.com/news/5012-journey-into-moroccan-history-a-visit-to-the-jews-of-
morocco-exhibition-at-nys-center-for-jewish-history (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) (reviewing museum
exhibit and citing extensive sources on Jewish life in Morocco); and American Sephardi Federation,
International Symposium, 2,000 Years of Jewish Life in Morocco: An Epic Journey, available at
http://www.americansephardifederation.org/morocco-symposium.html (last visited May 30, 2012)
(describing symposium, with audio recordings of sessions). See also Jessica Marglin, Modernizing
Moroccan Jews: The AIU Alumni Association in Tangier, 1893-1913, THE JEWISH QUARTERLY
REVIEW, Vol. 101, No. 4 (Fall 2011) 574-603 (Jessica Marglin, the author of the article, was a
participant in the symposium).
21. See MOROCCO CONST. pmbl.:
Etat musulman souverain, attach6 A son unit6 nationale et A son intigrit6
territoriale, le Royaume du Maroc entend pr6server, dans sa pldnitude et sa
diversit6, son identit6 nationale une et indivisible. Son unit6, forgde par la
convergence de ses composantes arabo-islamique, amazighe et saharo-hassanie,
s'est nourrie et enrichie de ses affluents africain, andalou, h6bralque et
m6diterranden. [Editors' translation: A sovereign Muslim state, committed to
national unity and territorial integrity, the Kingdom of Morocco intends to
preserve, in its fullness and diversity, its national identity, one and indivisible. Its
unity, forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamic, Amazigh [Berber] and sub-
Saharan components is nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian,
Jewish and Mediterranean tributaries].
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and Spanish is widely used in the northern parts of the country.2 2
Morocco's specific form of spoken Arabic is known as Darija. Morocco's
cultural history is also reflected, among other things, in its celebrated
architecture and interior designS2 3 and skilled weaving of prized carpets. 24
22. See MOROCCO CONST. art. 5 ("L'arabe demeure la langue officielle de l'Etat... De mime,
I'amazighe constitue une langue officielle de l'Etat, en tant que patrimoine commun b tous les
Marocains sans exception."). [Editors' translation: "Arabic remains the official language ofthe State. .
. Similarly, the Amazigh language is an official State language, as a common heritage to all
Moroccans without exception. '".
Cf U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: MOROCCO 1 (Apr. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/eilbgn/5431.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2012), issued before the 2011
Moroccan Constitution and mentioning Arabic alone as Morocco's official language:
Arabic is Morocco's official language, but French is widely taught and serves as
the primary language of commerce and government. Moroccan colloquial
Arabic, Darija, is composed of a unique combination of Arabic, Berber, and
French dialects. Along with Arabic, about 10 million Moroccans, predominantly
in rural areas, also speak one of the three Moroccan Berber dialects (Tarifit,
Tashelhit, and Tamazight). Spanish is also used in the northern part of the
country. English is increasingly becoming the foreign language of choice among
educated youth and is offered in many public schools from the fourth year on.
23. The Metropolitan Museum of Art in 2011, as part of its re-modeling of its Islamic
Galleries, centrally featured Moroccan art and architecture. See Randy Kennedy, History's Hands, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2011, at ARl:
Almost 30 years later the museum was embarking on the most ambitious
rethinking and rebuilding of its Islamic art galleries in its history, a $50 million
endeavor. At the heart of those galleries, which will open in the fall [of 2011]
after being closed six years, it dreamed of showcasing the defining feature of
Moroccan and southern Spanish Islamic architecture: a medieval Maghrebi-
Andalusian-style courtyard, which would function in much the same way such
courtyards still do in the traditional houses and mosques of Marrakesh or
Casablanca, as their physical and spiritual center.
The Andalusian courtyard was designed and built by Arabesque, Inc., whose president and CEO,
Adil Naji, is quoted extensively in the article. See also http://www.moresque.com/ceo.htm (last visited
Mar. 21, 2012).
24. Ronnie Reich, "Untangling Threads: Female Artisans in Morocco 's Rug Industry"
review: Exhibit Highlights the Hidden World ofMorocco's Female Rug Weavers, STAR LEDGER, Dec.
13, 2010, available at http://www.nj.com/entertainment/arts/index.ssf/2010/12/untangling_threads_
femalearti.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (describing rug weaving industry, including work of
Kantara Rugs (www.kantararugs.com): "[I]ntricately woven rugs - full of jewel-toned zigzags and
diamond patterns - cover the ground. These carpets have been at the center of life in Moroccan
villages for thousands of years. But it isn't only their aesthetic or practical value that makes them such a
unique part of their society. In a country where men preside over leatherwork, metalwork, sewing,
knitting, embroidery and almost all artisan crafts, weaving is a woman's world."); Alia Kate, Untangling
Threads: Women Artisans in Morocco's Rug Weaving Industry, MOROCCOBOARD NEWS SERVICE,
Nov. 4, 2010, available at http://www.moroccoboard.com/viewpoint/64-author/4898-untangling-
threads-women-artisans-in-moroccos-rug-weaving-industry (the author, Alia Kate, is the founder of
Kantara Rugs) (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
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Morocco has long been a subject of intense interest for scholars of many
disciplines, including novelists,25  travel writers, anthropologists and
more. 2 7
Principal sources of revenue in Morocco include tourism and
remittances from Moroccans living abroad, who, as a group, maintain
Moroccan citizenship rights.29 Morocco also has extensive agricultural and
fishing industries30 and holds 85% of the world's wealth in phosphates, a
primary ingredient in fertilizers with many other industrial, agricultural and
consumer uses.31 Morocco has numerous trade agreements with various
countries, including a fair trade agreement with the United States.3 2 There
is an ongoing effort to promote entrepreneurship in Morocco along with the
rest of the Maghreb through, among others, the North African Partnership
for Economic Opportunity.3
25. See e.g., PAUL BOWLES, THE SHELTERING SKY (1949); LAILA LALAMI, SECRET SON
(2009).
26. See EDITH WHARTON, IN MOROCCO (1920) (often an orientalist period piece, written by a
famed American writer about her travels in Morocco). Significantly, the book is dedicated by the author
to then French Resident General in Morocco Hubert Lyautey "to whose kindness the journey I had so
long dreamed of surpassed what I had dreamed." Id. at 9.
27. See generally the special edition of Susan Slyomovics, Cliford Geertz in Morocco, 16 J.
N. AFR. STUD. (2009); RACHEL NEWCOMB, WOMEN OF FES: AMBIGUITIES OF URBAN LIFE IN
MOROCCO (2009) (including excellent bibliography of anthropologists and others writing on Morocco).
See also id. at 192:
Morocco is a country of multiple contexts, often extremes - between rural and
urban, poor and wealthy, religious and secular, provincial and cosmopolitan,
Berber and Arab - and there are just as many identities between those ranges....
28. Paul Silverstein, Weighing Morocco's New Constitution, MIDDLE E. RES. AND INFO. PROJ.
(July 5, 2011), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero0705l1 (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
29. See MOROCCO CONST. art. 17 ("Les Marocains r6sidant A l'6trangerjouissent des droits de
pleine citoyennetd, y compris le droit d'8tre blecteurs et 6ligibles.") [Editors' translation: "Moroccans
residing abroad enjoy full citizenship rights, including the right and eligibility to vote."]
30. Agriculture and Fishery, MOROKKO-INFO, http://www.marokko-info.nl/english/
agriculture-and-fishery/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
31. Brendan Borrell & Daniel Grushkin, Morocco Plans 800 Acre Resort Hotel Funded by
Fertilizer Cash, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-05/morocco-
plans-800-acre-resort-hotel-funded-by-fertilizer-cash.htmi (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
32. See Morocco's Economic Strengths, supra note 17. See also Morocco, PEACE CORPS,
http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfn?shell=1eam.wherepc.northafr&cntry=morocco (last visited Mar.
6,2012).
33. See Jose W. Fernandez, Cultivating Arab Spring Entrepreneurs: The U.S. Culture of
Private Innovation is a Vital, Easy Export to Sell, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2012, at Al 5 (referencing North
African Partnership for Economic Opportunity, including a major entrepreneurship conference in
Morocco in January 2012).
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Moroccans living abroad have formed diverse civil society and news
organizations3 4 for education and information regarding Morocco as well as
many activities to preserve their cultural heritage. Morocco has specifically
sought to strengthen the ties between Moroccans and Moroccans living
abroad through, among other things, the creation of the Ministry of the
Moroccan Community Abroad (CCME35); and the Ministry is recognized in
the Moroccan Constitution.
Without attempting to be inclusive, current challenges in Morocco
include on the legal side, implementing the 2011 constitutional reforms and
the advances in women's rights established in the 2004 Moudawana
revisions to Morocco's personal status code, and improving access to
justice; and on the socio-economic side, eradicating poverty, unemployment
(particularly youth, including among the best educated, some of whom have
34. Such news organizations include MoroccoBoard News Service and Morocco World
News. See, e.g., http://www.moroccoboard.com/ and http://moroccoworldnews.com/ (last visited May
30, 2012). For civil society organizations, see http://www.washingtonmoroccanclub.org/ ,
http://www.amp-usa.org/ and more (last visited May 30, 2012). Other organizations providing
intercultural exchange include Friends of Morocco. See Friends ofMorocco: Who We Are, available at
http://friendsofmorocco.org/who.html ("Friends of Morocco is a[n] organization of Americans, mostly
returned Peace Corps volunteers, with experience in Morocco and Moroccans in America united with an
interest in promoting educational, cultural, charitable, social, literary and scientific exchange between
Morocco and the United States of America.") (last visited May, 29, 2012).
35. See generally COUNCIL FOR THE MOROCCAN COMMUNITY ABROAD,
http://www.ccme.org.ma/en/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
36. See MOROCCO CONST. art. 163:
Le Conseil de la communaut6 marocaine A l'6tranger est charg6 notanment
d'6mettre des avis sur les orientations des politiques publiques permettant
d'assurer aux Marocains rdsidant A l'6tranger le maintien de liens 6troits avec leur
identit6 marocaine, les mesures ayant pour but de garantir leurs droits et pr6server
leurs int6r6ts, ainsi qu'd contribuer au d6veloppement humain et durable de leur
pays d'origine et i son progrbs. [Editors' translation: The Council of the
Moroccan community abroad is particularly responsible for issuing opinions on
the direction of public policies to ensure that Moroccans residing abroad maintain
close ties with their Moroccan identity, which measures are aimed to guarantee
their rights and safeguard their interests, and contribute to sustainable human
development and progress of their country of origin.].
Connections to Morocco have also been furthered among Americans and Moroccan-Americans in
various ways including cultural exchanges, such as the Fulbright program and Peace Corps and
technical legal assistance programs. See, e.g,, FRIENDS OF MOROCCO, History of the Start of Peace
Corps in Morocco, http://friendsofnorocco.org/starthistory.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
For recent observations on Moroccan history, both political and social, including support for the
propositions in the text, see generally Lon Buskens, Sharia and National Law in Morocco, in SHARIA
INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF TWELVE MUSLIM
COUNTRIES IN PAST AND PRESENT 89, 89-138 (Jan Michiel Otto ed., 2010) [hereinafter sometimes
referred to as Sharia and National Law in Morocco]; Silverstein, supra note 28.
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engaged in dramatic and violent protests), illiteracy, and corruption, many
of which were the subject of the Arab Spring and ongoing protests and the
ensuing constitutional reforms. Following the approval of the constitutional
reforms, parliamentary elections were held on November 25, 2011.
Established as a French protectorate in 1912, Morocco secured full
independence from France in 1956. Mohammed V served as its first King
after independence, followed by his son Hassan II, in 1961, and then by his
son Mohammed VI, in 1999, who is serving presently.
III. THE 2011 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS ON THE JUDICIARY-
CIRCUMSTANCES AND TIMING
Taken together with the King's speeches, the 2011 Moroccan
Constitution demonstrates a will to reform, and the government
may be held accountable to its own words.
The constitutional reforms were adopted by a referendum held in
Morocco on July 1, 2011, following their presentation on June 17, 2011.
The referendum followed a long history of stated commitment to judicial
reform in Morocco, particularly as set forth in several major speeches by
King Mohammed VI. In a speech on March 9, 2011 (which is partly quoted
above), the King stressed the importance of an independent judiciary to
enhance the rule of law and equality before the law. 39 The timing of the
speech was perfect-in the midst of the Moroccan manifestation of the
37. See Paul Schemm, 5 U nipk loMtnsSdSewon FurASSOCIATED PRESS, ABCNEWS
(Jan. 19, 2012), available at http://abenews.go.com/m/story?id=15392114 (last visited Mar. 7, 2012);
Feuer, supra note 5; RACHEL NEWCOMB, supra note 27, p. 48 ("The future is often bleak for young
men, even for university graduates who find they still need connections to get a job."). See also
MOROCCO RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 23 (noting "Many young people lack education
or job opportunities, putting them at-risk for crime and possible involvement in religious extremism,
similar to the recent experience of other Islamic countries."). See also World Bank, Morocco at a
Glance, Feb. 25, 2011, available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/mar-aag.pdf (last visited Mar.
6, 2012); World Bank, Morocco: Country Brief Nov. 2011, available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAU/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/MOROCCOEXTN/,,cont
entMDK:20149674-menuPK:294547-pagePK: 141137-piPK: 141127-theSitePK:294540-isCURL:Y,0
0.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) ("Unemployment, especially among the youth, remains a critical
concern. Urban unemployment increased to 13.5% in the second quarter 2011 from 12.7% a year
earlier. In particular, youth joblessness in the urban areas deteriorated by almost 2.5 percentage points
to reach 33.4% while that of the educated jobless increased by I percentage point to 18.2%.").
38. The French protectorate encompassed most but not all of Morocco. See Buskens, supra
note 36, at 95. ("The Spanish gained control of the Northern part and an enclave in the South; the rest
of the country was placed under the authority of France, with the city of Tangier functioning as an
international zone under the joint administration of several foreign nations.")
39. See His Majesty King Mohammed VI, Speech at Rabat, supra note 1.
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Arab Spring, known as the February 20 protests, which were limited in
scope and intensity compared to the region for reasons fully explored
elsewhere.4 0 Although the constitutional reforms are widely attributed to
have softened the protests, it is unclear and perhaps controversial to what
extent the reforms satisfied the protesters' various demands. 4 1
Yet judicial reform was on the Moroccan agenda even before that
time. In a 2008 Throne Day speech, the King underscored the importance
of upgrading and revamping the judiciary to foster economic development
in Morocco and made important observations on judicial reform between
the two speeches as well, particularly in a speech on judicial reform in
August 2009.42 There he observed, among other things:
40. Norman L. Greene, International Law Weekend Panel Examines Access to Justice in the
Middle East and North Africa Before and After the Arab Spring, 20 ILSA Q. 22-24 (2011) [hereinafter
Access to Justice] (citing many sources, including on Morocco and the Arab Spring). See also Feuer,
supra note 5:
A group of Moroccan youths calling themselves the "February 20 Movement for
Change" organized nationwide protests demanding an end to corruption, greater
limits on the king's power, and more government attention to poverty and
unemployment. Like its counterparts elsewhere, the movement remained largely
leaderless and attracted a broad swath of the Moroccan population. At the same
time, however, it retained a firm commitment to the monarchy, allowing the
Moroccan regime to avoid the crisis of legitimacy that accompanied uprisings in
other Arab states.
More intense demonstrations and dramatic outcomes, however, need not result in more
democratic outcomes. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Revolt Leaders Cite Failure to Uproot Old Order in
Egypt, N.Y. TIMES (June 14 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/
middleeastlegyptian-revolts-leaders-count-their-mistakes.html?hp (last visited June 15, 2012) ("They
toppled a pharaoh, but now the small circle of liberals, leftists and Islamists who orchestrated Egypt's
revolution say they realize they failed to uproot the networks of power that Hosni Mubarak nurtured for
nearly three decades.")
41. Maati Monjib, The "Democratization" Process in Morocco: Progress, Obstacles, and the
Impact of the Islamist-Secularist Divide, at 10 (Saban Ctr. for Middle E. Pol. at the Brookings Inst.,
Working Paper, No. 5, Aug. 2011):
Furthermore, the draft Constitution presented by the king in his June 17, 2011
speech disappointed many of those who had initiated the youth movement. The
new Constitution, despite the progress it represents, leaves a bulk of power in the
hands of the monarch. The youth activists had fought, with the support of small
leftist parties like the Socialist Unified Party (PSU), for a true constitutional
monarchy where the king would have a role, but not govern.
See also, Paul Schemm, Morocco's King Lays Out Constitutional Reforms, ARAB AWAKENING,
June 17, 2011, available at http://arabawakenings.thestar.com/article/101 1068-morocco-s-king-lays-out-
constitutional-reforms (last visited April 12, 2012).
42. MOROCCO RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at iii. With respect to the same
August 2009 speech by the King, see also id. at 7:
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The judiciary is not only an essential prerequisite to ensure
citizens are equal before the law, but it is also a mainstay of
justice and of social stability. In fact, the legitimacy of the state
itself and the inviolability of its institutions derive their strength
from the power of justice, which is the cornerstone of governance
systems.... We seek to make justice more trustworthy, credible,
effective and equitable, because it serves as a strong shield to
protect the rule of law. It is a pillar of judicial security and good
governance, and acts as a booster for development.43
The author's prior article on this subject-preceding the constitutional
reforms, but focusing on the King's speeches presaging those reforms,
observed, "[a] first order question is how to get from A (the King's words
[relating to judicial reform] to B (an improved judiciary)."" Now that the
de jure constitutional reforms are here and approved, the first order
question changes to "how to get from the constitutional reforms to judicial
reforms," or, as otherwise stated, "how to get from de jure (constitutional)
reform to defacto (actual) reform?"
This article will address the key elements ofjudicial reform, beginning
with judicial independence, in the Moroccan context.
In a speech in August 2009 (marking the 56th anniversary of the 1953
Revolution), King Mohammed VI laid out a six-part strategy for judicial reform,
focusing on strengthening guarantees of judicial independence, modemizing the
regulatory framework, overhauling structure and staffing, increasing efficiency,
enforcing rules to prevent corruption and abuse of office, and ensuring optimal
implementation of reforms.
The USAID-sponsored publication further observed that the 2009 speech "was unprecedented
because it was solely dedicated to judicial reform." Id. at 1. See also with respect to the 2009 speech,
Siham Ali, King Mohammed VI Calls for Overhaul of Judicial System, MAGHAREBIA.COM, (Aug. 24,
2009), http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtmll/enGB/features/awi/features/2009/08/24/
feature-01 (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
See also Aziz Mekouar, Judicial Reform in Morocco, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2009), available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9DO6E6DE173FF930A3575ACOA96F9C8B63 (last
visited Mar. 7, 2012) (King "called for a six-pronged approach to reforming the judiciary, including
ethics training, reinforcing current safeguards, upgrading the quality of court officials and greater
transparency of procedures.") (The letter-writer, Hon. Aziz Mekouar, was then Ambassador to the
United States from Morocco; he retired from his post in 2011 after long service.).
43. See Full Text of HM the King's Speech on 56th Anniversary of the Revolution of the King
and the People, MAP (Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.map.ma/en/discours-messages-sm-le-roilfull-text-
hm-kings-speech-56th-anniversary-revolution-king-and-people (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
44. Norman L. Greene, Morocco: Beyond King's Speech & Constitutional Reform: An
Introduction to Implementing a Vision of an Improved Judiciary in Morocco, MOROCCOBOARD NEWS
SERVICE (Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://www.moroccoboard.com/viewpoint/380-norman-
greene/5484-morocco-beyond-kings-speech-a-constitutional-reform (last visited June 24, 2012).
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IV. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
What precisely needs to be done to secure judicial
independence? Establish a system which structurally and
through a course of incentives leads the judge to act impartially.
A. Constitutional Reforms Bearing on Judicial Impartiality
Judicial independence is not an end in itself but rather is a means for
achieving fair and impartial courts: in short, judicial impartiality.45 It has
both structural as well as behavioral aspects, and Morocco's 2011
constitutional reforms address both. The commitment to judicial
independence is not limited to Morocco within the region; "[i]n recent
years, Arab states have endorsed the idea of judicial independence in
accordance with international standards; they have also proclaimed their
acceptance of the principle of separation of powers.", 6
Structural independence considers the judiciary's relationship to other
branches of government and is sometimes related to the phrase "separation
of powers." It asks whether government, as constitutionally organized,
lends itself to an independent judiciary, separate from the other branches of
government.4 7  In Morocco, under Article 107 of the Constitution,
separation of powers is guaranteed, and thus the Constitution specifically
addresses structural judicial independence: "Le pouvoir judiciaire est
inddpendant du pouvoir Idgislatif et du pouvoir ex&utif Le Roi est le
garant de l'inddpendance du pouvoirjudiciaire.A8
45. See Judicial Reform in Developing Countries and the Role of the World Bank, in THE
WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS AND LECTURES 147, 159 (Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata et al. eds., 1993) ("While the independence of the judiciary is an important element of a judicial
reform program, it should be recalled, however, that such independence is not an end in itself. Rather, it
is a means to achieve the goal of the impartiality of the judge and the fairness ofjudicial procedures.").
46. Adel Omar Sherif & Nathan J. Brown, Judicial Independence in the Arab World: A Study
Presented to the Program of Arab Governance of the United Nations Development Program, UNITED
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 6 (2002), available at http://www.pogar.org/
publications/judiciary/sherifljud-independence.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (The authors reference
Article 82 of Morocco's 1996 Constitution as embracing judicial independence). See also Alwaleed bin
Talal, The Lesson of the Arab Spring, WALL ST. J., Feb 6, 2012, at Al3 (reflecting on the Arab Spring
and on "judicial institutions whose independence and integrity are vital to the safeguarding of rights"
and observing that "[diemocracy entails far more than elections and votes.").
47. KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 107 (Brookings Inst. 2006).
48. MOROCCO CONST. art. 107. (Editors' translation: The judiciary is independent of the
legislative and executive branches. The King is the guarantor of the independence of the judiciary.).
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The provision is strengthened from Article 82 of the Constitution of
1996 which covers the same subject matter.4 9 Although the first sentence in
both expresses a similar concept (except article 82 in the 1996 Constitution
references "L'autoritejudiciare," not "Le pouvoirjudiciare" as does Article
107 in the 2011 Constitution), the 2011 Constitution adds the second
sentence specifying the King's direct role in ensuring judicial
independence. The use of the same word (pouvoir, 2011) rather than a
different word (L 'autorite, 1996) to describe the judiciary as to describe the
legislative and executive branches also tends to suggest the equality of the
judicial branch with the others.
Behavioral independence, however, relates to not just whether judges
are "dispassionate and free from bias, but [whether they are] willing to take
difficult positions, to resist corruption, and to make truly independent
decisions."50 "Part of behavioral independence resides in the judge as a
person" and depends on the judge's place in society and education." Nor is
behavioral independence an unalloyed virtue, since there is no social
benefit in judges acting regardless of law and issuing mischievous, if not
pernicious, decisions.
Those using the phrase "judicial independence" need to be precise as
to its meaning and limits. "To say that [behavioral] judicial independence
is desirable or undesirable is to say little unless there is agreement on what
judicial independence means."" However, "[j]udicial independence
certainly means that judges are not coerced to decide cases,"54 let alone
49. MOROCCO CONST. art. 82 (1996) ("ARTICLE 82 ("L'autorit6 judiciaire est ind6pendante
du pouvoir l6gislatif et du pouvoir exdcutif."), available at http://www.maroc.ma/NR/
rdonlyres/B6B37F23-9F5D-4B46-B679-B43DDA6DD125/0/Constitution.pdf (last visited Mar. 7,
2012).
50. DAM, supra note 47, at 107.
51. Id. at 112 ("Part of behavioral independence resides in the judge as a person: is a judge
able to be dispassionate and free from bias, able to resist political pressures and the temptations of
corruption, and so forth?"), 115 ("The place in society that a judge enjoys, and feels he has, depends
very much on the quality ofjudges and how the public views them.").
52. See Norman L. Greene, Appointive Selection ofJudges, Limited Jurisdiction Courts with
Non-Lawyer Judiciaries, and Judicial Independence, 43 COURT REVIEW 80, 98-99 (2007) [hereinafter
Appointive Selection ofJudges] (Court Review is a publication of the American Judges Association).
53. Id. at 98.
54. Id. In the Moroccan context, see Aida Alami, Trial Puts Morocco's New Charter Under
Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/world/africal
trial-puts-moroccos-new-charter-under-spotlight.html?pagewanted=&_r-l&ref--middleeast (last
visited Mar. 7, 2012) (quoting Moroccan businessman who attended recent trial: '"I voted yes at the
referendum for this new Constitution,' he said during an interview this month in his office. But 'an
independent justice is not one that gets orders on the phone."'). For further discussion of so-called
telephone justice, see infra.
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induced to decide them by corrupt means. Such coercion and inducement,
according to published reports (some of which are quoted above), are too
much a part of Moroccan judicial life. "The impact of the executive's
authority over the administration of justice [in Morocco] is not always
obvious in daily life. When the justice system has to deal with an affair
involving the illegal fortunes of leading members of society, however, it
rapidly becomes visible.""
Article 109 of the Moroccan Constitution expressly prohibits conduct
tending to corrupt the judiciary or impair judicial impartiality, noting as
follows:
Est proscrite toute intervention dans les affaires soumises A la
justice. Dans sa fonction judiciaire, le juge ne saurait recevoir
d'injonction ou instruction, ni 8tre soumis A une quelconque
pression. Chaque fois qu'il estime que son ind6pendance est
menacde, le juge doit en saisir le Conseil Sup6rieur du Pouvoir
Judiciaire. Tout manquement de la part du juge A ses devoirs
d'inddpendance et d'impartialit6, constitue une faute
professionnelle grave, sans pr6judice des cons6quences
judiciaires 6ventuelles. La loi sanctionne toute personne qui
tente d'influencer le juge de manibre illicite.56  [Editors'
translation in footnote]
Specifically, Article 109 bars unlawfully attempting to influence the
judge (La loi sanctionne toute personne qui tente d'influencer le juge de
manidre illicit); a judge who considers his judicial independence threatened
must so inform the Supreme Judicial Council (Chaquefois qu'il estime que
son inddpendance est menacge, le juge doit en saisir le Conseil Superieur
55. Transparency Maroc, Casablanca, Royal Power and Judicial Independence in Morocco, in
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007: CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 233 (Transparency Int'l
2007), available at http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr-2007#download (last visited Mar.
12, 2012). The voluminous Transparency International, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, which
contains contributions from various authors on many countries (including Morocco), provides an
interesting overview on international judicial reform from many perspectives.
The quote in the text from the GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007 also recognizes the notion
that judicial independence is not an "all or nothing" proposition: e.g., courts may function
independently in some cases, such as routine commercial or family law cases, but not in other cases,
such as political ones.
56. See MOROCCO CONST. art. 109. [Editors' translation: Any intervention in cases brought
to justice is prohibited. In his judicial function, the judge should not receive orders or instructions or be
subjected to any pressure. Whenever he considers that his independence is threatened, the judge must
advise the Supreme Judicial Council. Any failure by the judge in his duties of independence and
impartiality is serious professional misconduct, without prejudice to possible legal consequences. The
law prohibits anyone from improperly attempting to influence the judge.].
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du Pouvoir Judiciaire); and a judge who compromises the judge's
independence and impartiality is subject to professional and potential legal
sanctions (Tout manquement de la part du juge 4 ses devoirs
d'indpendance et d'impartialitd, constitue une faute professionnelle grave,
sans prejudice des consdquencesjudiciaires gventuelles). As the King has
elaborated, "[t]o preserve the inviolability of the judiciary, the draft [and
now final] Constitution criminalizes any interference, corruption or
influence peddling with regard to the judiciary."" Similarly, Article 110 of
the Moroccan Constitution requires judicial impartiality (de l'application
impartiale de la loi), as follows:
Les magistrats du siege ne sont astreints qu'd la seule application
du droit. Les d6cisions de justice sont rendues sur le seul
fondement de l'application impartiale de la loi. Les magistrats du
parquet sont tenus i l'application du droit et doivent se
conformer aux instructions 6crites 6manant de l'autorit6
hibrarchique.s5
The standards in Articles 109 and 110 of the Moroccan Constitution -
understood in light of the King's speech-are fully consistent with
international standards such as those set forth in the Bangalore Principles
of Judicial Conduct (in Value 1.1): "A judge shall exercise the judicial
function independently on the basis of the judge's assessment of the facts
and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of
any extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference,
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason."" But as discussed
below, there are inherent limits to this proposition as it presumes that the
law the judge is called upon to apply meets a standard of justice and
57. HM King Mohammed VI, Speech to the Nation (June 17, 2011), available at
http://www.lavieeco.com/actualite/morocco-new-constitution-hm-king-mohammed-vi-addressed-a-
speech-to-the-nation-5886.htmi (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
58. See MOROCCO CONST. art. 110. [Editors' translation: The judges are required to enforce
the law. Judicial decisions are made solely on the basis of the impartial application of the law.
Prosecuting authorities are bound to enforce the law and must comply with written instruction from
their superiors.].
59. See Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, supra note 7, 1 1.1. See also THE
UNIVERSAL CHARTER OF THE JUDGE (1999), available at American Bar Association, Rule of Law
Initiative (initially published under Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative Judicial Reform
Program) in COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON JUDICIAL REFORM AND JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, pp. 15, 16 (Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative 2004), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/docs/judicial-reform-compilation-international-standards 2004.pdf
(last visited June 24, 2012) ("Article 4. Personal autonomy. "No one must give or attempt to give the
judge orders or instructions of any kind, that may influence the judicial decisions of the judge, except,
where applicable, the opinion in a particular case given on appeal by the higher courts.").
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fairness. Consider the appropriate rule when the law is odious or otherwise
unjust, and pressure comes from quarters calling on the judge to be just and
fair.60
Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri once observed that
improper influence on judges has taken place in Morocco, including
through "telephone justice,"' where political figures dictate case outcomes.
As the Associated Press reported, "Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi-Fihri
acknowledged 'phone call justice' exists, in a speech before the Brookings
Institute in March [2011]. Judicial independence 'is not the reality today,
because [there are] some calls from time to time, from the Justice
Department to some judge. But now we want to assure this total
60. The U.N. Basic Principles are to the same effect under Principle 2. See UN. Basic
Principles, supra note 8, princ. 2 ('The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the
basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences,
inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.").
To suggest that the principle requiring impartial application of the law depends on context - including
the fairness and justice of the law - is not intended to suggest that any particular Moroccan law is unfair
and unjust. See, e.g., A Perspective on Nazis in the Courtroom, supra note 10 (citing sources);
Executioners, Jailers, Slave-trappers, and the Law, supra note 10 (citing sources).
61. See Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri, Embracing Reform: A Message from King
Mohammed VI of Morocco (March 23, 2011), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/events/2011/0323_morocco/032311_moroccotranscript.pdf
(last visited Mar. 12, 2012). See in particular page 15 of the transcript of the Foreign Minister ("First,
[Morocco is seeking] total [judicial] independence. It's not the reality today. And because some calls
[come] from time to time, from the Justice Department to some judge. But now we want to assure this
total independence."). See also Carolyn A. Dubay, Morocco's "Arab Spring" and Judicial
Independence, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL MONITOR, American Society of International Law (2011),
available at http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive-spring20l 1/sectorassessment.html (last visited June
10, 2012) ("[I]t is the behind the scenes exchanges between politicians and judges that must be
addressed through a change in legal culture and a true understanding of the role of an independent
judiciary in a constitutional democracy or monarchy. Certain trappings of a modern judicial system may
be necessary to attract foreign investment and serve commercial interests, but improving the legitimacy
and independence of the judiciary will require far more of a cultural shift. . . .")
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has also extensively discussed what is commonly
referred to as "telephone justice." See Norman L. Greene, Appointive Selection of Judges, Limited
Jurisdiction Courts with Non-Lawyer Judiciaries, and Judicial Independence, 43 CT. REV. 80, 98
(2007). See also Kathryn Hendley, 'Telephone Law'and the 'Rule of Law': The Russian Case, HAGUE
JOURNAL ON THE RULE OF LAW, 1:241-262 (2009), available at
http://law.wisc.edu/m/nmytc/telephone-law-and-rol.pdf.
Nor is the issue of judicial independence fully resolved in the United States. See, e.g.,
Perspectives from the Rule of Law, supra note 13 (among other things, addressing the rule of law,
judicial independence, and judicial elections in the United States); Norman L. Greene, How Great is
America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias? An Inquiry into the Supreme Court's Decisions in Caperton
and Citizens United, Their Implications for Judicial Elections, and Their Effect on the Rule of Law in
the United States, 112 W.VA. L. REV. 873 (2010) [hereinafter America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias].
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independence,' he [i.e., the Foreign Minister] said."62 This is not an issue
of whether judicial impartiality is required as a matter of Moroccan law
(which it is and has been even before the 2011 constitutional reforms), 63 but
rather whether it exists as a matter of fact, and if it does not, how to achieve
it.6 Prohibiting such practices as telephone justice and other coercion,
including under the authority of Articles 109 and 110 of the Constitution, is
essential to protect judicial impartiality, not to mention judicial
independence.s
Lack of impartiality (or judicial bias) also implicates the question of
the rules governing recusal (or disqualification): that is, when should a
particular judge be removed, or voluntarily step down from, a particular
case because the judge has a conflict of interest or it appears that the judge
cannot be fair.6 The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct thus
provide that a "judge shall disqualify himself or herself from participating
in any proceedings in which the judge is unable to decide the matter
impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that the
judge is unable to decide the matter impartially."67 Thus the appearance of
bias is enough to disqualify:
While personal corruption is certainly a problem, the appearance
of judicial bias-or what could be called "perceived
corruption"-is also a problem. Many legal systems view this
latter type of corruption as equally dangerous, particularly
62. See Paul Schemm, Moroccan Justice: sold to highest bidder, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(December 8, 2011), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9985284 (last visited
Mar. 7,2012) (also quoting author); see also Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri, supra note 61.
63. NATHAN J. BROWN, ARAB JUDICIAL STRUCTURES: A STUDY PRESENTED TO THE UNITED
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (2001), available at http://www.undp-pogar.org/
publications/judiciary/nbrown/morocco.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (citing "Article 82 [of the pre-
2011 reformed [i.e., 1996] Moroccan Constitution]. The Judiciary shall be independent from the
legislative and executive branches."). The pre-reformed Moroccan Constitution's Judiciary Articles
also appear at MOROCCO RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 12.
64. Morocco: Justice Lacks Independence & Public Confidence, Wikileaks, MOROCCOBOARD
(Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://www.moroccoboard.com/news/34/5005 ("A cable, recently released
by wikileaks, and written a year ago by the US Embassy in Rabat, noted that the Moroccan judicial
system lacks independence and public confidence, and it represents an impediment to Morocco's
development and reform. . . . The Judges are not independent of the Ministry of Justice, political
pressure to influence outcomes is used by officials and palace insiders").
65. See, e.g., America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias, supra note 61; Perspectives from the Rule
of Law, supra note 13 (among other things, addressing the rule of law, judicial independence, and
judicial elections in the United States).
66. See, e.g., America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias, supra note 61.
67. Bangalore Principles ofJudicial Conduct, supra note 7, 1 2.5.
[Vol. 18:2
Greene
because it causes public distrust in the judiciary. Public
confidence is vital to a well-functioning judiciary, so regardless
of whether actual bias exists, the appearance can be sufficient to
remove a judge from a particular case.
In addition to covering (in Articles 109 and 110 of the Moroccan
Constitution) the importance of impartiality and the consequences of its
absence, Moroccan law should provide details on when and how judges
should be disqualified from handling cases. Preserving impartiality is not
only an issue of designing the right system, but also an issue of having the
appropriate procedures in place for use, case by case, judge by judge.
In addition to formal law, this may also involve professional codes,
ethics and standards and many of the ideas set forth in the Bangalore
Principles of Judicial Conduct, the U.N. Basic Principles, and like
models.
B. Implementing Reform Through Structural Changes in Judicial Oversight
Maximizing independence requires insuring that judges' careers do not
depend on their making decisions favoring a particular group of persons
with the power to enhance their careers. 7 0  Among other things, this is
necessary to ensure that judges are not put into a position of deciding
between their professional judgment and their career advancement.' (In
68. Kevin J. Mitchell, Neither Purse Nor Sword: Lessons Europe Can Learn From American
Courts' Struggle For Democratic Legitimacy, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 653, 656-57 (2006-2007)
(footnote omitted).
69. The author is informed of at least one ethical code for Moroccan judges, which does not
have the force of law, prepared recently by an association of judges in Morocco (amicale hassanienne
des magistrats). Source: Moroccan judge, anonymous. See Charte D'Ethique Judiciaire (on file with
the author and the law review). Rules must fix not only when a judge should be disqualified but how
the disqualification procedure should operate. For example, is the decision to disqualify the judge's
alone or may it be reviewed and enforced by other authorities where the judge refuses disqualification
himself or herself? See generally, e.g., America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias, supra note 61.
70. See Schemm, Moroccan Justice: sold to highest bidder, supra note 62 ("Morocco's courts
have historically been weak and under the control of the king and his Justice Ministry, which determines
judges' salaries and appointments so that they will often rule as instructed for the sake of their
careers."). However, even the statement in the text may be over-inclusive. Assume such persons with
economic or political power over judges prize even-handed and impartial justice and the efficient
handling of cases. In that situation, there might be nothing wrong with pleasing them. The problem,
more narrowly conceived, is judges who slant the law to help the rich and powerful because they are
rich and powerful in order to maintain their position or get ahead, and the rich and powerful request
outcomes for personal or political gain, not for impartiality or efficiency.
71. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Independence and Corruption, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION
REPORT 2007: CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 16 (Transparency Int'l 2007), available at
http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2007#download (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (the
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the United States, a different problem occurs where judges are elected:
namely, judges appearing to make certain decisions to please the
electorate---or campaign contributors-in particular cases, rather than
making impartial decisions according to the law.). 72
Achieving this independence requires more than attention to a
constitution but also to judicial selection and promotional processes.
According to a 2010 USAID-sponsored report on Morocco, "[t]he current
judicial system [in Morocco] is permeable to political influence, and the
mechanisms through which judges are appointed, promoted, sanctioned,
and dismissed leave them vulnerable to political retribution. "73 The hope
of career enhancement needs to be removed as one incentive for becoming
less independent. As the U.N.'s Basic Principles on the Independence of
the Judiciary provides, "promotion of judges, wherever such a system
exists, should be based on objective factors, in particular ability, integrity
and experience."74
Thus it is necessary to design independent committees to select,
nominate or promote judges, without over-involvement of other branches of
government, such as the Ministry of Justice, to help ensure that they act
article makes general observations but is not specific to Morocco). Judicial independence may be
threatened by other branches of government, of course. But, as previously noted, it may also be
threatened by the judicial election system in place in a number of states in the United States. Any
observations in this paper about other countries are not intended to suggest that there are no judicial
independence problems or issues in the United States.
72. See, e.g., Perspectives from the Rule of Law, supra note 13 (among other things,
addressing the rule of law, judicial independence, and judicial elections in the United States); see also
Valerie Wigglesworth, Former Judge Suzanne Wooten Maintains Innocence Despite Bribery Conviction
in Challenge to Subpoena, DALLAS MoRNiNG NEWS, June 21, 2012, available at
http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/2012/06/former-judge-suzanne-wooten-maintains-innocence-despite-
bribery-conviction-in-challenge-to-subpoena.html/ (last visited May 12, 2012) ("Suzanne Wooten
acknowledged the jury's nine guilty verdicts on felony charges last year that forced her to resign from
the 380th Judicial District Court bench. But she maintains her innocence in a scheme that prosecutors
say funded her 2008 judicial campaign in Collin County in exchange for future favorable rulings in
court."). Of course, judges are not bound to issue decisions which displease the electorate or campaign
contributors. The problem arises when pleasing them is the principal motivating factor for decisions as
opposed to the impartial application of the law.
73. MOROCco RULE OF LAW ASSESSEMENT, supra note 3, at 12. See also Moroccan Judges,
Lawyers Demand Judicial Reform, May 17, 2012, available at
http://www.iranian.com/main/blog/darius-kadivar/check-balances-moroccan-king-receives-judges-
calling-legal-reform-and-justice-0 (last visited June 10, 2012) ("The Moroccan government and the
Royal family are seen to have inordinate power over the judiciary through their control of salaries and
promotions and it is believed that many verdicts follow the will of the executive branch.")
74. See UN. Basic Principles, supra note 8.
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independently.7 s In a leading text not involving Morocco (but applicable to
it), the author observed that "[i]f promotion is handled by a government
agency-the ministry of justice-independence may be compromised....
One outcome may be judges who are reluctant to stand up to the
government."7 "The rule of law is not secure when the body for its
enforcement is composed of judges who either fear challenging the
government or are already predisposed toward declaring its deeds legal."n
The constitutional reform removes any leadership role of the Ministry
of Justice from the newly established judicial regulatory council (Le
Conseil Supirieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire) unlike what had been the case
with the predecessor council, but it remains unclear whether other
influences on the judicial evaluation or regulatory processes will unduly
affect judicial independence.78 (For example, the King chairs the council as
75. See Siham Ali, King Mohammed VI Calls for Overhaul of Judicial System, MAGHAREBIA
(August 24, 2009), available at http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awilxhtmil/enGB/features/awi/
features/2009/08/24/feature-01 (last visited Mar. 7, 2012), noting:
It is high time that Morocco change the poor domestic and international
perception of its justice system, said Habib Choubani of the judiciary committee
in parliament. Also important is the independence of the judiciary from the
government, "for as long as the Minister of Justice has . . . a role in the
appointment of judges, it will be impossible to speak of an independent
judiciary."
See also MoRocco RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 13, which observed before the
2011 constitutional reforms:
[The Ministry of Justice] exercises significant influence over the appointment,
discipline, transfer, and promotion ofjudges. The exercise of these powers makes
judges beholden to the [Ministry] not only for their initial appointment but for
their continued job security as well, with obvious negative implications for
judicial independence.
Although, as noted above, the 2011 constitutional reforms reduced the involvement of the
Ministry of Justice, the above sources may be read as cautioning against any other branch involvement
with judicial opportunities for similar reasons.
76. DAM, supra note 47 at 117.
77. Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and
Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 608 (1996).
78. See HM King Mohammed VI, Speech to the Nation (June 17, 2011), available at
http://www.lavieeco.com/actualite/morocco-new-constitution-hm-king-mohammed-vi-addressed-a-
speech-to-the-nation-5886.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012):
Similarly, the draft Constitution sets up the "Higher Council of the Judicial
Branch," as a constitutional institution headed by the King, in replacement of the
Higher Council of the Judiciary, with a view to giving administrative and
financial autonomy to the new Higher Council. It also makes the President of the
Court of Cassation Executive President of the Council-instead of the Minister of
Justice in the current Constitution-the aim being to bolster the separation of
powers.
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well as nominates judges).79 This is not a question of whether separation of
powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches is required
by law (which it is), as the constitutional reform confirms. Rather, it is a
question of whether it is required (or exists) as a matter of fact and that the
systems in place ensure that.80
C. The Limits of Judicial Independence-A Philosophical Perspective
There are limits to judicial independence. "Fixing the meaning of
behavioral independence, for example, requires attention to key questions,
including independence from what and to do what. No one wants judges to
be free to do whatever they like."8  Moreover, "[w]hile adequate
institutions might enhance judicial independence and minimize the
problems of a politicized judiciary, increasing the powers and independence
enjoyed by judges risks creating the opposite problem of over-judicializing
public policy."82
In the United States, it is common to observe that judges, absent
special circumstances, such as constitutional review which the new
Moroccan constitutional court is empowered to conduct,83 should not be
(The "Higher Council of the Judicial Branch" mentioned in the King's speech is referred to
elsewhere in this article as the Supreme Judicial Council.)
79. See MOROCCO CONST. art. 56 (Le Roi prdside le Conseil Supirieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire)
[Editors' translation: "The King chairs the Supreme Judicial Council."]; art. 57 (Le Roi approuve par
dahir la nomination des magistrats par le Conseil Sup6rieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire) [Editors' translation:
"The King approves by decree the appointment ofjudges by (or for) the Supreme Judicial Council."].
80. See BROWN, supra note 63, $ 5 (prior to the 2011 Moroccan Constitution) ("The
Moroccan Constitution clearly endorses the principle of separation of powers, but the Ministry of Justice
still plays a significant role in judicial affairs.").
81. Appointive Selection ofJudges, supra note 52, at 97 (article extensively analyzes judicial
independence). This section does not lessen the importance of judicial independence; however, in
exploring its meaning and highlighting its ambiguities, it seeks to sharpen the dialogue.
82. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and
Judicial Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 201, 215 (2009).
83. See HM King Mohammed VI, Speech to the Nation (June 17, 2011), available at
http://www.lavieeco.com/actualite/morocco-new-constitution-hm-king-mohammed-vi-addressed-a-
speech-to-the-nation-5886.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012):
To confirm the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution and the law, the
Constitutional Council has been elevated to the rank of a "Constitutional Court"
with extensive powers which, in addition to existing prerogatives, include
checking the constitutionality of international conventions and ruling on disputes
between the State and the regions. In order to promote democratic citizenship, this
Court has been authorized to look into litigants' claims regarding the
unconstitutionality of a law which the Judiciary may deem detrimental to
constitutional rights and freedoms.
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rejecting legislation; and judges certainly should not be doing so solely
because of their own personal preferences. This is the issue of deference to
legislation, which has arisen in Morocco, notably in connection with
judicial enforcement of the acclaimed Moroccan family code (or
Moudawana) reforms in 2004. (Such reforms are discussed below and in
many referenced sources.")
As the U.S. State Department has observed in 2011, for instance,
"Implementation of the controversial family law remained a concern
because it is largely dependent on the judiciary's willingness to enforce it,
and many judges rooted in conservative attitudes did not agree with its
intent."85  The difficulty in such implementation has been the subject of
extensive commentary, including on whether such judges should be
asserting their patriarchal preferences in opposition to the law.
How far the general proposition may be extended-that judges should
enforce, not thwart constitutional legislation-of course, is beyond the
scope of this article. Some legislation may be so odious (yet constitutional
See MOROCCO CONST. arts. 129-34 (establishing Constitutional Court).
84. See Access to Justice, supra note 40, 22-24 (citing many sources). For a view of the old
family law, see Sharia and National Law in Morocco, supra note 35, at 89-138. See also id. at 113:
Until the reforms of 2004 the patriarchal model of family relations formed the
basis for Moroccan family law. Marriage and regulations concerning divorce,
descent, custody over children, and inheritance law were structured by
intrinsically unequal relations of exchange between a husband and wife.. . . This
patriarchal model is rooted in classical Islamic law and the related world view, as
well as in conceptions shared by many Moroccans. In family law this resulted in
institutions criticised by reformers, such as obedience of a wife to her husband,
polygamy, male marriage guardianship over daughters, and repudiation as a male
privilege.
85. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: MOROCCO (Apr. 8, 2011),
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154468.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2012)
[hereinafter 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: MOROCCO]. For a more detailed discussion citing
excellent sources, see generally Access to Justice, supra note 40, at 20-24. Cf Sharia and National
Law in Morocco, supra note 36, at 109-110 ("Until now, our knowledge about actual practice is scant;
progressive Moroccan scholars and activists have been very critical of the judges' interpretations of the
new law (e.g., Benradi et al. 2007). Research on judicial practice and everyday understandings of the
law is still required.").
86. See generally Access to Justice, supra note 40 (especially the cited references). Further
research might be conducted concerning whether opposition to the implementation of the law has been
spearheaded by judges appointed before the time the law went into effect or judges appointed since that
time, and what, if any, lessons may be drawn from such analysis.
In some contexts where there is a contest between certain customs and traditions and a planned
formal justice system (perhaps embodying modem human rights principles), such customs and traditions
may prevail since nothing else may be practicable. Where various forms of law exist simultaneously
like this, the environment is termed legally pluralistic. See, e.g., CUSTOMARY JUSTICE AND RULE OF
LAW, supra note 6.
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under the laws of a particular country at a particular time) that conventional
wisdom and theory fail.87 In that context (presumably not applicable to
Morocco), it may be impossible to serve as a judge in the ordinary sense, if
the judge has a conscience. That situation aside, a few other observations
are in order.
If a judge is typically unwilling to apply a nation's existing rules and
makes her own, whenever she does so she is acting not like a judge but a
legislature or perhaps something else.88 Although the results in particular
cases might be good (or bad, depending on the judge and the context), it is
unclear why a nation would wish to have a single official (like a judge)
legislate on behalf of everyone, following personal rules. (Judges are
typically trained to apply the law, regardless of their personal agreement or
disagreement).
Indeed, if several judges disagreed with each other, one might have
conflicting "judicial legislation," and predictability in the law (to the extent
it is a virtue) would vanish (unless a higher court resolved conflicts between
individual judges).8 9 So would equal treatment under the law, since results
in like cases would vary depending on the assigned judge. Of course, even
87. Although this is a common statement in the United States-that American judges should
not be applying their own personal preferences as opposed to the law-one might argue that it might not
be universally applicable. For example, justice in some countries might be better served from an
international human rights perspective by a judge personally opposing an anti-human rights law, even
though the law technically required the opposite result. Of course, where judges impose their own
personal preferences to avoid odious laws, the judiciary would be a very different type of judiciary than
is commonly understood by American lawyers. In addition, if a legislative process lacked legitimacy
derived from popular election or other indicia of popular support (for example, a corrupt legislature or
one which merely did the bidding of a despot), there is scant basis for insisting that judges adhere to the
laws as presented by the legislature.
There is ample literature regarding whether and when judges may follow their conscience rather
than law, how they should do so, and what are the implications of their doing so. See, e.g., A
Perspective on Nazis in the Courtroom, supra note 10 (citing sources); Executioners, Jailers, Slave-
trappers, and the Law, supra note 10 (citing sources). Of course, were each judge in a particular
country to apply her own personal preferences regardless of law, a chaotic and whimsical judicial
system would result.
This problem, like many, may not be conducive to neat solutions, and the resolution may depend
on circumstances and trade-offs, such as trading lack of certainty or predictability for more humane
outcomes.
88. It has become an American convention to use the feminine personal pronoun rather than
the masculine wherever possible when gender is unknown. However, the extent to which this fits this
situation involving the Moroccan judiciary may depend on the number of women in the Moroccan
judiciary.
89. Extreme examples of deference to legislation include the post-revolutionary French
judiciary, which played a "very minor role of merely interpreting in a narrow, almost mechanical way,
the meaning of legislation passed by the Assembly." DAM, supra note 47, at 107.
while applying the law with which she disagrees, a judge need not silently
accept it: rather, she may signal to the public how she recommends that the
law should be changed.
But predictability is not an absolute virtue, particularly where there is
no structural independence. Predictability in that context might mean that
the judicial power always follows the rule of the legislative or executive
power. Nor is predictability a virtue where the laws are unjust, since that
would lead to predictable injustice.90
Yet in other situations, predictability is considered a positive attribute
since it allows people and businesses to plan their affairs and reasonably
anticipate that their wishes will be respected. Among other things, this
plays an important role in commerce and personal succession (e.g.,
inheritance). Predictability is also important for civil wrongs and crimes,
since a person needs to know what is permitted or not so that compliance is
possible.
If a judge disagrees with a few of the nation's laws (yet the laws are
permissible under the nation's constitution), the law may provide that the
judge may decline to serve or step aside in particular cases, depending on
the applicable law. If a judge disagreed with many, it is unclear why the
judge would wish to serve, except to subvert or ameliorate them. Although
that approach may make things better (or worse), the judge would not be
acting as a judge under the common understanding of that term, perhaps
"something else" instead, such as an insurgent or movement leader. Again,
even though that might be appropriate in certain times, places and
circumstances, such a judge would not satisfy the common understanding
of what a judge is.9 '
90. See Perspectives from the Rule of Law, supra note 13 at 62 (the rule of law should not be
the rule of any law even if that enhances predictability; the goal of rule of law reform is not to
strengthen the efficiency of authoritarian regimes).
91. A Perspective on Nazis in the Courtroom, supra note 10, at 1122. See also, Stephen
Ellmann, To Resign or Not to Resign, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1997) (reflecting, among other
things, on anti-apartheid judges in apartheid-era South Africa, who chose to remain on the bench). The
article was part of a symposium entitled Executioners, Jailers, Slave-trappers and the Law: What Role
Should Morality Play in Judging? The symposium is published beginning at 19 CARDOZo L. REV. 963
(1997), commencing with Norman L. Greene, Preface. Id. at 963. See supra note 10.
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V. THE NEED FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT AS A TOOL FOR
JUDICIAL REFORM
Though common in every society, whether democratic or
authoritarian, corruption is the great curse of developing
countries, and Morocco is no exception. ',92
For an "agent of corruption, " the Moroccan courts are a
cornucopia of opportunity. The country's judges are notoriously
susceptible to pressure from the executive branch of government
and business interests as well as from more humble petitioners
with handshakes full of cash.93
ARTICLE 36 of the Moroccan Constitution [Anti-corruption
provision]
Les infractions relatives aux conflits d'intir&ts, aux ddlits
d'initid et toutes infractions d'ordre financier sont sanctionnges
par la loi. Les pouvoirs publics sont tenus de privenir et
rdprimer, conformiment ii la loi, toutes formes de ddlinquance
lides a l'activitJ des administrations et des organismes publics, a
l'usage des fonds dont ils disposent, ei la passation et ai la gestion
des marchds publics. Le trafic d'influence et de privildges,
I'abus de position dominante et de monopole, et toutes les autres
pratiques contraires aux principes de la concurrence libre et
loyale dans les relations 9conomiques, sont sanctionnis par la
loi. Il est crid une Instance nationale de la probitg et de lutte
contre la corruption.94 [Editors' translation in footnotedj
92. JOSEPH BRAUDE, THE HONORED DEAD 188 (2011).
93. Id. at 190. See also MOROCCO RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 18:
Corruption in Morocco - both financial and misuse of authority and power - is
one of the most significant challenges confronting the transition to democracy and
results in lack of procedural fairness for citizens. While there have been some
campaigns against corruption and impunity, they are short-lived and perceived by
the community as a show for the outside world.
94. MOROCCO CONST. art. 36. [Editors' translation: Offenses relating to conflicts of interest,
insider trading and all financial offenses are punishable by law. Public authorities are obliged to
prevent and punish, according to law, allforms of crime related to the activity of government and public
bodies and the use of the funds they have available for the award and management ofpublic contracts.
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ARTICLE 167 of the Moroccan Constitution [Anti-corruption
provision]
L'Instance nationale de probitd et de lutte contre la corruption,
crie en vertu de 'article 36, a pour mission notamment de
coordonner, de superviser et d'assurer le suivi de la mise en
(Euvre des politiques de privention et de lutte contre la
corruption, de recueillir et de diffiser les informations dans ce
domaine, de contribuer b la moralisation de la vie publique et de
consolider les principes de bonne gouvernance, la culture du
service public et les valeurs de citoyennetd responsible.95
[Editors' translation infootnote]
A. Corruption and the Judiciary
Given the extensive attention to corruption in Morocco and the close
ties between anti-corruption efforts and judicial reform, the subject of
corruption warrants a separate section. Articles 36 and 167 of the
Moroccan Constitution are the principal anti-corruption provisions of the
constitution, both broadly banning corrupt activities (including influence-
peddling and conflicts of interest), and establishing as a constitutional
matter an anti-corruption commission (to oversee the policies to fight
corruption and more). Also relevant are Article 158 of the Moroccan
Constitution (which requires, as a constitutional matter, public disclosure of
the assets of public officialS96) and Article 109, which prohibits forms of
judicial corruption.
Trading in influence and privileges, abuse of a position of dominance and monopoly power, and
all other practices contrary to the principles of free and fair competition in economic relations, are
sanctioned [i.e. punishable] by law. There shall be a national authority for integrity and for the fight
against corruption [i.e. an anti-corruption commission].]
95. MOROCCO CONST. art. 167. (Editors' translation: The particular mission of the [anti-
corruption commission] established under Article 36 [of the Moroccan Constitution] includes to
coordinate efforts to supervise and monitor the implementation of policies to prevent and fight
corruption, to collect and disseminate information in this area, to contribute to the moralization of public
life and to strengthen the principles of good governance, a culture of public service, and values of
responsible citizenship.]
96. See MOROCCO CONST. art. 158:
Toute personne, 6lue ou ddsign6e, exergant une charge publique doit 6tablir,
conform6ment aux modalitds fixies par la loi, une d6claration 6crite des biens et
actifs d6tenus par elle, directement ou indirectement, d6s la prise de fonctions, en
cours d'activit6 et A la cessation de celle-ci.
[Editors' translation: Any person, elected or designated, having a public office
must set forth, in accordance with the terms laid down by law, a written
declaration of property and assets such person holds, directly or indirectly, as of
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The ills of corruption, as commonly defined,97 are well-documented
and need not be reiterated here, except to note that a corrupt judge is
decidedly not an independent judge or impartial one. The corrupt judge-
beyond committing a crime-puts the judge's own interest over the judge's
commitment to law and makes law generally irrelevant. In the case of
bribery, corrupt judges sell judicial decisions, and the most relevant
consideration is not legal reasoning or persuasive facts (or simply what is
right or wrong) but rather price.
Not only are bribes prohibited, but according to the Bangalore
Principles of Judicial Conduct, so should be other types of private gain,
including gifts, loans, and favors, as the Bangalore Principles state: "A
judge and members of the judge's family, shall neither ask for, nor accept,
any gift, bequest, loan or favour in relation to anything done or to be done
or omitted to be done by the judge in connection with the performance of
judicial duties."98 To the same effect are the United Nations' Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.99
Finally, judicial corruption undermines impartial justice, and the lack
of such justice (according to much commentary, including the King'soo),
impedes economic development and investment.'0 ' Ensuring judicial
impartiality requires targeting and eliminating judicial corruption.
the time such person took office, while engaged in such office, and when such
person's term of office ends.].
97. For a definition of corruption, see BERTRAM I. SPECTOR ET AL., USAID: CORRUPTION
ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK Sect. 2 (Mgmt. Systems Int'l May 8, 2006) (Draft Final Report), available at
http://wwwl.worldbank.orglpublicsector/anticorrupt/USAIDCorAsmtHandbook.pdf (last visited March
7,2012):
Corruption is often defined as the misuse of entrusted authority for private gain.
It occurs any time that public officials or employees misuse the trust placed in
them as public servants for either monetary or non-monetary gain that accrues to
them, their friends, their relatives or their personal or political interests.
(emphasis in original).
98. Bangalore Principles ofJudicial Conduct, supra note 7, 4.14.
99. See UN Basic Principles, supra note 8, 2 ("The judiciary shall decide matters before
them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper
influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for
any reason.").
100. HM King Mohammed VI, Speech on 9th Anniversary of Throne Day (July 30, 2008),
available at http://www.map.ma/eng/sections/speeches/full-text-of_ hmking 1/view (last visited
March 7, 2012).
101. See e.g., DAM, supra note 47, at 127 ("Simply put, the absence of a reliable contracting
law and independent judicial enforcement system is a barrier to economic development."). See
generally Perspectives from the Rule of Law, supra note 13, at 71 (citing Brad Smith, Senior Vice
President, Legal & Corporate Affairs, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary, Microsoft Corporation,
American Society of International Law Second Century Dinner, Text of Prepared Remarks,
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B. Judicial Corruption in Morocco
Examples of judicial corruption in Morocco, based on a variety of
sources, including academics,102 journalists,10 3 U.S. government,'0 and
Moroccan government (witness the royal speeches), 05  have been
extensively reported. The World Bank has also observed in a 2003 report
that the private sector believes that judicial corruption is prevalent in
Morocco and the Moroccan public has an expectation of judicial
corruption.10 6 The report observed that progress is being made but more is
needed.'0o Of course, once the public becomes aware of prevalent
corruption (even if it is not 100% or is improving), suspicion and wariness
of the court system abounds. Imagine how an American lawyer (or even a
business) would respond to the news that many, if not all, of the courts in a
particular city or state are corrupt. Who would take the chance of using the
courts there?
A U.S. State Department publication on Morocco issued in 2011
noted, "[c]orruption and impunity reduced police effectiveness and respect
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 3, 2006)), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/bradsmith/11-
03-06IntemationalLaw.mspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (relationship between economic growth and
judicial independence).
102. Monjib, supra note 41, at vi ("The judiciary should be reformed to end corruption and a
lack of independence from the executive."). See also id. at 25:
A reform of the judiciary is needed. The judiciary suffers from corruption and a
lack of independence from the executive, and fails to enforce many rulings.
Reforming the judiciary would enhance the population's sense of security and
rule-of-law, and thus boost entrepreneurial initiatives while attracting more
foreign investment.
103. See Schemm, Moroccan justice: sold to highest bidder, supra note 62; see also
Abderrahim El Ouali, Morocco Clamours for Justice, IPSNEWS, NORTH AFRICA UNITED, Apr. 23, 2012,
available at http://www.northafrica united.com/Morocco-Clamours-for-Justice al268.html ("Huge
swathes of the population have long called for sweeping reforms of Morocco's corrupt justice system...
. Just last month, police arrested a judge in Tangier, 300 kilometres north of Casablanca, for corruption.
According to the Justice Minister, the judge in question was caught red-handed receiving a sum of
70,000 dirham (approximately 663 euros) from a citizen.").
104. See, e.g., 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: MOROCCO, supra note 85, at 25 ("In July
2009 the High Judiciary Council sanctioned 70 judges on corruption-related charges, according to
NGOs.").
105. Id. at 24-25 ("The judiciary's lack of independence and susceptibility to influence were
widely acknowledged, including by the king. In August 2009 the king called for judicial system reform,
including greater judicial independence and corruption prevention. Since 2007 the law has required
judges, ministers, and members of parliament to submit financial disclosures.").
106. LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, WORLD BANK, MOROCCO, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SECTOR
ASSESSMENT 32 (June 2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/lNTLAWJUSTINST/
Resources/MoroccoSA.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
107. Id.
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for the rule of law. Petty corruption was widespread among the police and
gendarmes, and broader, systemic corruption undermined law enforcement
and the effectiveness of the judicial system." 08 Wikileaks cables are to the
same effect, reflecting allegations of extensive corruption through the
highest levels of government, affecting the real estate sector.'09 According
to another report, "[d]uring the last decade, successive national and
international reports have shown that corruption in Morocco has reached
'endemic' proportions, i.e., that it permeates every aspect of life: politics,
business, the central administration, local government, public services, and
the judicial system. Even before WikiLeaks revealed American worries
about the royal circle's encroachment on the economic sphere,
Transparency International's Global Corruption Report (2007) highlighted
the connection between royal powers and corruption in the Moroccan
justice system." 0
In an Associated Press article published in December 2011, a reporter
observed that results in cases in Morocco have been sold for $5000 and
provided examples of bribery."' Others have reported that judicial
corruption includes "the use of intermediaries, or 'samsara,' [a practice
which] is [allegedly] widespread in the Moroccan court system. In
exchange for a commission these middlemen go between the litigant and
lawyers, police officers or judges in order to influence the judgment, or
even prevent the case from being taken to court."ll 2 The Associated Press's
108. 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: MOROCCO, supra note 85..
109. Ian Black, WikiLeaks Cables Accuse Moroccan Royals of Corruption, GUARDIAN.CO.UK
(Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/06/wikileaks-cables-morocco-
royals-corruption (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
110. Abdeslam Maghraoui, Ducking the Arab Spring in Morocco, IMMANENT FRAME (May 23,
2011), available at http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/05/23/ducking-the-arab-spring-in-MOROCCO/ (last
visited Mar. 7, 2012).
111. Schemm, Morocccan justice: sold to highest bidder, supra note 62 ("Justice is one of the
most sensitive issues in this tourist-friendly North African country of 32 million, where there is
widespread distrust of a court system that most Moroccans believe serves the highest bidder. 'Justice'
can be bought in civil trials for just $5,000. In sensitive trials against terror suspects or feisty
journalists, a call from a powerful official is enough to seal a guilty verdict.").
112. Business Anti-Corruption Portal, Morocco Country Profile (2011), available at
http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/morocco/corruption-
levels/judicial-system/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (citing March 2009 article by LA VIE ECO). The
Moroccan Country Profile further observed that "[t]he use of intermediaries testifies to a lack of trust in
the judiciary system, which is also observed [by the Morocco Country Profile] in Transparency
International's (TI's) Global Corruption Barometer 2010, according to which, less than a fifth of the
surveyed households states that the judicial system is 'extremely corrupt,' while in TI's Global
Corruption Barometer 2009, more than one-third reports to have paid a bribe to the judiciary within the
precedent year." Id. The Business Anti-Corruption Portal does not cite to any particular pages of the
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observations are essentially in line with the introductory quotation to this
section referencing handshakes of cash and the courts being a cornucopia of
opportunity for graft. A USAID-sponsored publication likewise references
judicial demands for bribes in exchange for procedural advantage." 3
But where courts issue corrupt decisions, they make the judicial
system a mockery, one which renders decisions for the sake of decisions
regardless of law.1 4 No reasonable government would abandon the state to
such corruption,"s and as noted below, anti-corruption activities in
Morocco are underway.
C. What to Do: Improved Regulation and Enforcement
To strengthen the effort against corruption, governments as a general
matter must encourage and protect reporting of corruption and provide
confidential ways to report (e.g., whistleblower protection). If people are
too intimidated to report, nothing will be reported except by the boldest." 6
There should be no retaliation by or on behalf of judges or other authorities
permitted against persons who fairly report. Without whistleblower
protections of this nature, far from those who report being protected, some
Barometers or state whether it is relying on Moroccan or regional specific sources or other data within
the Barometers. (The Barometers are annual multi-regional and multi-country public opinion surveys.)
Interpreting Transparency's Global Corruption Barometers either in general or as to Morocco in
particular is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, the implications of both Barometers, taken
together with other sources cited in this article, are that there is much work to do in addressing
corruption in Morocco.
113. MOROCCO RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 18-19 ("Attorneys and human
rights activists reported that judges have been known to phone parties before their hearing in order to
explain that the hearing could be cancelled if they pay a fee.").
114. Nigel Rodley, A Symposium on Constitutional Rights and International Human Rights
Honoring Professor David Kretzmer: The Singarasa Case: Quis Custodie. . . ? A Test for the
Bangalore Principles ofJudicial Conduct, 41 ISR. L. REV. 500, 512 (2008). See also Benjamin Weiser,
Ex-Senator Receives 7-Year Term in Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 2012, A-21, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2OJ2/O4/27/nyregion/carl-kruger-sentenced-to-seven-years-in-corruption-
case.html (sentencing an American legislator for bribery, U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff stated that "it
was difficult to overstate the evils that are wrought when government officials succumb to bribery....
'We have only to look at other countries . . . to see that once corruption takes hold, democracy itself
becomes a charade, justice becomes a mere slogan camouflaging a cesspool of self-interest."')
115. The question may not come to actual abandonment of the state to corruption but rather
how effectively the state fights the battle against corruption, including which and how many resources it
devotes to the effort of eradicating it.
116. 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: MOROCCO, supra note 85, at 25. ("Officials attributed
the low number of complaints in part to the lack of legislation protecting plaintiffs and witnesses in
corruption cases."). As noted below, since the date of the cited article, such protective legislation has
been enacted.
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may end up as targets for inquiry or other retaliation."' 7  Prosecution will
help deter and remove the sense of impunity from those who would corrupt
the judiciary. It may also lead other witnesses, who see that complaints are
being taken seriously by the authorities, to come forward.
Having absorbed this message, in addition to adopting the anti-
corruption constitutional reforms, Morocco enacted new anti-corruption
legislation in 2011, which, among other things, protects against retaliation
and provides safe measures for reporting,' 8 although the future success of
the law (including enforcement) will need to be assessed." 9 Some details
of the law, which focuses on whistleblower, victim and witness protection,
and which already have been the subject of some enthusiastic news
coverage in Morocco,120 follow:
117. Schemm, Moroccan justice: sold to highest bidder, supra note 62. See also JOSEPH
BRAUDE, THE HONORED DEAD 190 (2011) ("A broader scandal came to light a year earlier [in 2006] in
the northern city of Tetouan, where seven lawyers published an open letter slamming the city's courts
for dealing in graft every day. They complained of rampant complicity between area drug lords, judges,
and city magistrates. Rather than earn accolades for coming forth, the lawyers faced legal proceedings
initiated against them by magistrates in Tetouan that led to their disbarment."). The Honored Dead
further reported a person who "reputedly makes his living greasing palms in the city's judiciary." Id.
"This specialization would not altogether surprise me," the book's author observed. Id.
118. See Siham Ali, New Moroccan Law Protects Graft Trial Witnesses: Just-passed
Legislation Will Enable Moroccan Citizens to Speak Out Against Corruption Without Fear of
Retaliation, MAGHAREBIA (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://magharebia.com/cocoon/
awilxhtmltlenGB/features/awilfeatures/2011/10/18/feature-02 (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) [hereinafter
Ali, A New Moroccan Law].
119. See id. ("Earlier this month [of October 2011], Parliament passed a law protecting the
victims of corruption as well as whistleblowers who speak out to expose it. The new law also provides
for a special hotline on which people can tip off the police about corruption."). The Full Title of the
Law is "Loi no. 37-10 modifiant et completant la loi no. 22-101 relative a la procedure penale en
matiere de protection des victims, des temoins, des experts et des denonciateurs en ce qui concerne les
infractions de corruption, de detournement, de traffic d'influence et autres." (A copy of the law, in
French, is on file with the author and law review). Article 82-7 of the law, among other things,
indicates the types of crimes for which protection is provided.
120. Mustapha Safar, Arrest of Land Registrar of Ain Achok is an Execution of Witness
Protection Bill, ASSABAH, Dec. 1, 2011. This article was written subsequent to the date of the anti-
corruption legislation, which is referenced as Bill 10-37 [sic] related to the protection of witnesses and
whistleblowers published in the official journal n 5988 on 23 October 2011, and modifying and
completing the provisions of the Bill of Criminal Procedures regarding the protection of victims,
witnesses, experts and whistle-blowers of crimes of corruption, embezzlement, abuse of power, etc. The
article points out how the arrest it describes was made possible by the law protecting witnesses and
whistleblowers from harassment and observes that previous whistleblowers and witnesses were indeed
harassed and subject to retaliation. The article, which appeared in a daily newspaper in Casablanca, is in
Arabic and on file along with its translation with the author and law review. It was translated into
English by Professor Brahim El Guabli, Swarthmore College.
The [anti-corruption] law envisages a raft of measures, including
ways to protect the families of graft trial witnesses and
guarantees to prevent any material or moral harm to witnesses.
The legislation also provides for the protection of the property
and interests of those involved in such cases. A special telephone
number will be made available to notify the police should trial
witnesses receive threats or have any concerns about their safety
or that of their family. The witness, expert or whistle-blower will
be granted anonymity during the trial and will not be named in
case documentation. Measures have also been set out to prevent
intimidation or violence towards the person concerned and
members of their family, such as the provision of protection
officers. In addition, the law will also prosecute anyone reporting
a supposed crime with malicious intent or making unfounded
allegations. 121
Morocco's anti-corruption commission, called The Central Authority
for the Prevention of Corruption (ICPC), has the following "main
objectives [which] are to propose strategic directions for a corruption
prevention policy, build a database on all information related to corruption,
inform the judiciary of corruption cases and organise [sic] corruption
awareness campaigns." 2 2  (It is further noteworthy that "Morocco [has
121. Ali, New Moroccan Law, supra note 118. See also American Bar Association, Rule of
Law Initiative, Morocco Approves Landmark Witness and Whistle Blower Protection Law, Nov. 21,
2011, available at http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/ruleoflaw/wherewework/middle
east/morocco/news/news moroccowitnesswhistleblower-protection law approved_1111 .html (last
visited May 22, 2012):
The law offers significant protection to witnesses and experts, allowing judges
and prosecutors to ensure their safety (and the safety of their families) through a
number of mechanisms, including new identities and safe houses. While these are
common practices in many countries, they are new to Morocco. Moreover, a
witness or expert may demand these protections if they are not offered by the
judge or prosecutor, and whistleblowers are now protected from administrative or
criminal sanctions if corruption is revealed to them in the course of their duties.
Oversight mechanisms will be established to ensure that neither individuals nor
agencies can engage in reprisal.
For the importance of protecting whistleblowers from retaliation as part of an effective anti-
corruption program, see David Banisar, Whistleblowing: International Standards and Developments
(Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, UNAM, Mar. 2006), available at
http://www.corrupcion.unam.mx/documentos/investigaciones/banisarpaper.pdf (last visited Mar. 7,
2012).
122. OECD, Fostering Integrity in the Public Sector: Morocco, OECD Middle East and North
Africa Initiative on Governance and Investment for Development, available at
http://www.oecd.org/docunent/27/0,3746,en_34645207_34645555_45699803_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Mar. 7, 2012). Prior to the recent anti-corruption whistleblower legislation and the passage of
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held] as of December 2011, the presidency of the Arab Anti-Corruption and
Integrity Network (ACINET).").123 Anti-corruption agencies are one of the
devices used by governments as a tool against corruption, with varying
results depending on their structure, relationship to other branches of
government, resources, and government commitment to the task.124
There were also existing anti-corruption provisions in the laws in
Morocco governing judges, yet the problems do not appear to have abated
before the adoption of the 2011 Moroccan Constitution. Existing law, for
example, includes the dahir portant loiformant statut de la magistrature,'25
the constitutional reforms, the Moroccan corruption agency was criticized for ineffectiveness. See
JOSEPH BRAUDE, THE HONORED DEAD 190 (2011) (noting criticism of ICPC for lacking "independence,
a clear mandate, or any significant authority."). For a critical view of anti-corruption commissions
generally, see John R. Heilbrunn, Anti-Corruption Commissions: Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight
Corruption?, WORLD BANK INST. (2004), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.orgfWBL/Resources/wbi37234Heilbrunn.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
The official website for Morocco's ICPC is available at: http://www.icpc.ma/wps/portal (last visited
Mar. 7, 2012).
123. Morocco to be President ofArab Anti-Corruption Network as ofDecember 2011, YACOuT
INFO (Oct. 27, 2011), available at http://www.yacout.info/Morocco-to-be-president-of-Arab-Anti-
Corruption-Network-as-of-December-201 Ia3991.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
124. See John R. Heilbrunn, Anti-Corruption Commissions: Panacea or Real Medicine to
Fight Corruption?, supra note 122. For a cynical view of certain anti-corruption commissions, see, e.g.,
id. at 1:
[G]ovemments in poor countries need international investments and donors
require that they reduce corruption and improve their management of the
economy. An anti-corruption commission may therefore represent an effort to
satisfy international donors and placate domestic calls for reform, if only for a
short while. Anti-corruption commissions are especially problematic when
political leaders are only responding to demands from international donors. In
such countries, policymakers can ignore domestic demands for reform and enact
minimal reforms to satisfy external agents. This minimum may be nothing more
than the establishment of an anti-corruption commission, an office of the
ombudsman, or an anti-fraud unit without enabling legislation, competent staff, or
a budget.
125. Dahir portant loi no 1-74-467 du 26 chaoual 1394 (11 novembre 1974) (dahir portant loi
formant statut de la magistrature) (copy on file with author and law review), noting at Article 20:
Les magistrats sont protdgds, conformement aux dispositions du code pdnal et des
lois spdciales en vigueur, contre les menaces, attaques, outrages, injures ou
diffamations dont ils peuvent 9tre l'objet. [Editors' translation: "Judges are
protected under the provisions of the Penal Code and special laws in force,
against threats, attacks, insulting or defamatory acts to which they may be
subjected. '.
The law also includes, among other things, a description of the types ofjudges, qualifications for
employment, retirement provisions, some disciplinary procedures, assorted other regulatory procedures,
and various provisions reminiscent of the "terms and conditions" of employment for judges. Id. A
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which, among other things, bars threats, insults and attacks against judges.
But the sweep of the law (the dahir) is not comparable to the broad anti-
corruption provisions in the constitutional reforms: e.g., barring coercion
and inducements of judges. Existing law on judges-whether by its
amendment or by passage of separate law-may need to be expanded to
comport with the constitution's anti-corruption themes in Articles 36, 109
and 167, cited above.
Anti-corruption constitutional reforms and legislation need to be
combined with judicial, prosecutorial, and investigatory resources to
develop the evidence (in addition to the whistleblower evidence) in order
successfully to prosecute corruption cases. Anti-corruption efforts should
be a budgeting and financial priority.
D. Education or Cultural Changes as Strategic Solutions
Corruption is partly a legal issue susceptible to legal solutions such as
those above: e.g., are there adequate laws against corruption, and if so, are
they enforced with sufficient resources allotted to the enforcement and
investigative authorities.126  Allowing people to "get away with it"
(impunity) may lead to more of the same, with some even seeing this as a
way to earn a living.127 Improved and enforceable (and enforced) laws may
help.
complete analysis of Moroccan criminal law available to prosecute judicial corruption is beyond the
scope of this article. But see 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: MOROCCO, supra note 85, at 11:
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but the government
did not implement the law effectively, and officials often engaged in corrupt
practices with impunity. It was common knowledge that corruption was a serious
problem in the executive, including the police, legislative, and judicial branches
of government. There were reports of government corruption during the year, and
the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators indicated that corruption
was a problem.
126. See MOROCCO RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 8:
In December 2008, the King appointed the members of the Corruption Prevention
Instance [i.e. the anti-corruption commission], in part to comply with the UN
Convention against Corruption which entered into force for Morocco in 2007, but
also in reaction to Morocco's low score on several key corruption indices, such as
that of Transparency International. The mission of the Instance is the prevention
of corruption although it has neither powers of investigation nor prosecution.
127. JOSEPH BRAUDE, THE HONORED DEAD 190 (2011). Cf Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Senator
Receives 7-Year Term in Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 2012, A-21, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/202/O4/2 7/nyregion/carl-kruger-sentenced-to-seven-years-in-corruption-
case.html (U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff, when sentencing a defendant in a government corruption
scandal to jail, observed, "The message must always go out that if you help corrupt our government in
any of its parts, prison is the consequence.")
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Corruption is also an educational or public awareness concern, a
message which has resonated in Morocco. "[A Moroccan teacher observed
that] '[t]he culture of blackmailing must be stamped out from an early age
and children must be steeped in positive values based on integrity and
honesty.. . . [A]dults must give a concrete demonstration of corruption's
negative repercussions on the country's development."'l 2 8 To that end, the
"Moroccan education ministry and the kingdom's main corruption
watchdog body are working together on plans to integrate ethics into school
curricula. The Central Authority for the Prevention of Corruption (ICPC)
and the education ministry signed an agreement on July 11th [2011] that
establishes a framework for co-operation to drive home the issue through
education." 2 9 Indeed, public awareness is part of the stated mission of the
anti-corruption commission. Moreover, as noted at a recent conference in
Morocco, judicial reform requires additional educational efforts overall.o30
Civil society also may play a role.
As a further safeguard against judicial corruption, judges should be
adequately compensated.13' Although it is unclear whether judges who are
underpaid are more corrupt than adequately paid ones, and a poorly paid
judge is capable of being an excellent judge, low pay (in the case of some
individuals) may provide an incentive to do the wrong thing (e.g., to
supplement one's income through bribes).132  Of course, raising salaries
128. Siham Ali, Morocco Fights Corruption Through Education: Schools Are the New
Battleground in Morocco's Anti-corruption Strategy, MAGHAREBIA (July 17, 2011), available at
http://magharebia.comlcocoon/awilxhtmillenGB/featurestawilfeatures/2011/07/17/feature-01 (last
visited Mar. 7, 2012).
129. Id.
130. Euro-Mediterranean Hum. Rts. Network, Seminar on Judicial Reform in Morocco (Sept. 2,
2010), available at http://www.euromedrights.org/en/news-en/emhm-releases/emhrn-statements-
2010/4124.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (reporting on conference held on January 22-23, 2010)
("Such change will require great efforts in terms of adult education for all actors in the judicial field
because they will need to absorb and integrate the precepts of a human rights culture founded upon the
universal principles of dignity, equality and equity.").
131. BROWN, supra note 63, 6 ("There have been some complaints in recent years that
salaries are low and the Ministry of Justice has worked to improve the situation in order to combat
opportunities for corruption."). Accord MOROCCO RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 19
(relating low judicial salaries to potential for corruption). The word "adequate,' of course, is imprecise;
and it is unclear how high salaries need to be to have an effect in warding off corruption.
132. Schemm, Moroccan justice: sold to highest bidder, supra note 62. See also id.:
Judges are often poorly trained and badly paid. Worse, they see it as their job to
help to police, said Rachid Filali Meknassi, the Moroccan representative for
global anti-corruption group Transparency International.
"In the face of the police, the judges are scared, in the face of politics, the judges
are scared, but when they have power, they sell it," he said.
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does not constitute a guarantee against corruption,133 yet there are other
reasons to provide judges adequate compensation, including enabling them
adequately to support their families and enhancing the prestige of the
judiciary so as to attract and retain qualified persons to a judicial career.134
Judicial corruption is a multilayered problem. Without seeking to be
comprehensive, it is a "perception problem" since it may lead some to
avoid the courts or even to engage further in corruption "as less expensive
and more certain than litigation." 3 5  It is a political stability problem;
among other things, an end to corruption was one of the demands of the
February 20 movement. As an obstacle to development and investment, it
is also an economic problem. In the final analysis, it is indeed an injustice
problem, since corrupt judiciaries yield results for a price (or something
else of value) regardless of law.
With the constitutional and other reforms, an improved legal
framework against corruption is in place. But with widespread adverse
publicity about dishonesty and lack of public confidence in the courts, it
may be a while before the poor (or mixed) reputation ends.13 6
VI. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND JUDICIAL REFORM
Independence is necessary but not sufficient. An independent
judiciary might itself be irresponsible or corrupt. If judges
operate with inadequate outside checks, they may become
slothful, arbitrary or venal. Thus, the state must insulate judicial
133. See USAID OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, GUIDANCE FOR PROMOTING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 32 (U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. Jan. 2002), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/docs/judicial reform usaid_.guidancejudicial-independence_2002_engl
ish.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) ("However, it is unclear whether increased salaries decrease the
temptation to accept bribes, especially among judges who are already steeped in a culture of corruption
and who may have taken the job in the first place because of its potential for exploitation.").
134. DAM, supra note 47, at 116. Addressing Ukraine, the author observes that there is little
judicial independence, low judicial pay, and "law students continue to consider a judgeship 'the lowest
position available in the legal profession."' Id.
135. Id. at 55.
136. See also ABDELAZIZ NOUYADI, MOROCCO, THE INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY OF
THE JUDICIARY 29 (Euro-Mediterranean Hum. Rts. Network 2008) (The legal profession in Morocco
needs to "enjoy a certain number of safeguards and immunities allowing them to exercise their duties
and perform their mission dedicated to justice and litigants" for there to be independent and impartial
justice.).
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institutions from improper influence at the same time as it
maintains checks for competence and honesty.137
Improvement of the judiciary not only requires judicial independence,
but also judicial accountability. In Morocco, the mechanisms for holding
judges accountable for their compliance with professional and legal
standards should be reviewed, and if necessary, reformed. Even if they are
working well, a good approach may still be improved.
Judicial promotion and discipline are among the matters entrusted to
the Supreme Judicial Council (Le Conseil Supirieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire),
a body whose membership (including many judges, but which is presided
over by the king) and purpose are set forth in Article 113 of the Moroccan
Constitution.' The adequacy of the functioning of the Council, a common
form of judicial regulatory body,'39 is beyond the scope of this article, and
the author expresses no opinion as to its effectiveness. Moreover, the
Council is replacing a prior judicial councilo40 in a stated effort to enhance
judicial independence, and assessment of the Council's work (which was
yet to begin at the time of the passage of the Constitution) appears to be
137. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 71, at 16. See also id. at 24 ("Corruption in the judiciary can
occur even when the courts are independent of the rest of the state. In fact, their very independence may
facilitate corruption because no one has the authority to oversee them.").
138. See also MOROCCAN CONST. art. 113:
Le Conseil Supdrieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire veille i I'application des garanties
accorddes aux magistrats, notamment quant A leur ind6pendance, leur nomination,
leur avancement, leur mise A la retraite et leur discipline. A son initiative, it
61abore des rapports sur l'6tat de la justice et du syst~me judiciaire, et pr6sente
des recommandations appropri6es en la matibre. A la demande du Roi, du
Gouvernement ou du Parlement, le Conseil dmet des avis circonstancids sur toute
question se rapportant A la justice, sous r6serve du principe de la s6paration des
pouvoirs.
[Editors' translation: The Supreme Judicial Council enforces the guarantees
accorded to the judges, especially regarding their independence, appointment,
advancement, retirement and discipline. On its own initiative, the Council
produces reports on the state ofjustice in the judiciary system, as well as makes
appropriate recommendations on that subject. At the request of the King, the
Government, or the Parliament, the Council issues opinions on matters relating
to justice, consistent with the principle ofseparation ofpowers.]
For promotional and disciplinary practices for judges, see also NOUYADI, supra note 136, at 17-20.
139. See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and
Judicial Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 201 (2009).
140. For Morocco's previous system of judicial evaluation, see BROWN, supra note 63
("Judicial supervision and inspection is generally the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, although
judicial personnel are used extensively in the task. Each level of courts carries some responsibility as
well and sanctions are meted out by the Supreme Judicial Council.").
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premature.141 (The heavy involvement in the prior council of the Minister
of Justice has been criticized for impairing judicial independence.14 2)
As a general matter, councils of this sort "are bodies that are designed
to insulate the functions of appointment, promotion, and discipline of
judges from the partisan political process while ensuring some level of
accountability. Judicial councils lie somewhere in between the polar
extremes of letting judges manage their own affairs and the alternative of
complete political control of appointments, promotion, and discipline. The
first model of judicial self-management arguably errs too far on the side of
141. See Morocco New Constitution: HM King Mohammed VI Addressed a Speech to the
Nation, LA VIE ECO (June 20, 2011), available at http://www.lavieeco.com/actualite/morocco-new-
constitution-hm-king-mohammed-vi-addressed-a-speech-to-the-nation-5886.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2012) [hereinafter Morocco New Constitution]:
Similarly, the draft Constitution sets up the "Higher Council of the Judicial
Branch" [Author's note: the name of the Council has been translated into English
in various ways, including the Supreme Judicial Council], as a constitutional
institution headed by the King, in replacement of the Higher Council of the
Judiciary, with a view to giving administrative and financial autonomy to the new
Higher Council. It also makes the President of the Court of Cassation Executive
President of the Council - instead of the Minister of Justice in the current
Constitution - the aim being to bolster the separation of powers.
Similarly, the composition of the new Council has been enhanced by increasing
the number of elected representatives of judges, as well as the representation of
women judges, making sure Council membership is open to personalities and
institutions operating in the area of human rights and the defense of judicial
independence.
Council powers have also been expanded to include, in addition to the judges'
career issues, the functions of inspection as well as the expression of opinions on
legislative and regulatory texts relating to the judiciary, and assessment of the
judicial system.
The prior council remains in place until the installation of the new one. See MOROCCO CONST. art. 178,
which so provides ("Le Conseil supbrieur de la magistrature, actuellement en fonction continuera
d'exercer ses attributions jusqu'A l'installation du Conseil Supdrieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire pr6vu par la
prdsente Constitution.")
142. See MOROCCO RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 13:
In addition, the MOJ [Minister of Justice] exercises significant influence over the
appointment, discipline, transfer, and promotion ofjudges. The exercise of these
powers makes judges beholden to the MOJ not only for their initial appointment
but for their continued job security as well, with obvious negative implications for
judicial independence.
See also Associated Press, Morocco's judges demand greater independence, AL ARABIYA NEWS, May
15, 2012, available at http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/05/15/214343.html (last visited May 27.
2012):
Morocco's courts have historically been weak and under the control of the king
and his Justice Ministry, which determines judges' salaries and appointments so
that they will often rule as instructed for the sake of their careers.
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independence, while pure political control may make judges too
accountable in the sense that they will consider the preferences of their
'political principals' in the course of deciding specific cases." 43
However, international experience suggests the standards and
functioning of any judicial council warrant further research, including in the
following areas: viz., confidential reporting of disciplinary matters, the
development and implementation of codes of judicial conduct, and effective
enforcement of such codes, including the fairness of judicial discipline.
(The UN Basic Principles note, for example, that fairness to judges in
disciplinary procedures needs to be assured).144
Codes of conduct should regulate and reinforce common rules of
judicial behavior, such as those governing fairness and good temperament
in the courtroom and conflicts of interest: e.g., including when a judge
should not sit on a case because of conflicts of interest or other reasons
raising a question as to the judge's impartiality. They should also prohibit
improper secret communications involving judges and parties (ex parte
communications), whether they implicate bribe-taking or other matters.
Confidential reporting of judicial misconduct to the Council is essential to
ensure that proper Council action may result, with reporters of misconduct
protected in order to ensure safety from judicial retaliation. (A model to
follow might be the Moroccan 2011 whistleblower legislation referenced
above). Court monitors may also be sent to observe courtroom proceedings
and report back to disciplinary authorities. Adequate resources should be
budgeted for investigation of misconduct and enforcement of codes of
conduct.
Judicial conduct codes should become part of the culture among
judges, lawyers and the public. Ethics training for judges has already been
called for by the King as well.145  International principles such as the
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct and the U.N. Basic Principles
provide a good start. So does Charte D'Ethique Judicaire, prepared by
Amicale Hassania des Magisrats (a Moroccan association of judges).14 6
143. Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 204.
144. See U.N. Basic Principles, supra note 8, 1 17 ("A charge or complaint made against a
judge in his/her judicial and professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an
appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. The examination of the matter at
its initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge.").
145. See Aziz Mekouar, Judicial Reform in Morocco, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2009), available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9DO6E6DE1 73FF930A3575ACOA96F9C8B63 (last
visited Mar. 7, 2012).
146. A copy of Amicale Hassania des Magistrats, Charte D'Ethique Judiciare, is on file with
the author and the law review. The document consists of ten principles or goals sought to be achieved
and multiple sub-principles, recommending certain behaviors in order to achieve those goals. The
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Presentations or seminars may be given on the subjects and articles written
on them at law schools and bar associations and elsewhere. (To the extent
that legal education and bar associations need development, doing so is
another task to address). 147 As previously observed, however, passing rules
is different from enforcing rules and changing behavior; and attention needs
to be paid to all aspects of the problem and potential solutions.
VII. RESPONSIBLE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AS AN AID TO JUDICIAL
REFORM
ARTICLE 28 of the Moroccan Constitution [Freedom of the
press]
La libertd de la presse est garantie et ne peut itre limite par
aucuneforme de censure prialable. Tous ont le droit d'exprimer
et de diffuser librement et dans les seules limites expressiment
privues par la loi, les informations, les iddes et les opinions. Les
pouvoirs publics favorisent I'organisation du secteur de la presse
de manidre inddpendante et sur des bases ddmocratiques, ainsi
que la ddtermination des r~gles juridiques et deontologiques le
concernant. La loi fixe les rigles d'organisation et de contrdle
des moyens publics de communication. Elle garantit I'acc~s a ces
moyens en respectant le pluralisme linguistique, culturel et
politique de la socidtd marocaine. Conformdment aux
dispositions de 'article 165 de la prdsente Constitution, la Haute
Autoritd de la Communication Audiovisuelle veille au respect de
ce pluralisme.148 [Editors' translation in footnote.]
principles include: I'independance, I'integrite, I'impartialite and la neutralite, I'egalite, le courage
moral, la dignite et la reserve, la competence, le comportementjudiciare, la decence, and la solidarite.
See also MOROCCO RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 32 (likewise recommending code of
professional ethics); NOuYADI, supra note 136, at 28 (referencing efforts of the "Moroccan civil society,
the Hassanian Association of Judges"). These documents obviously predated the Moroccan
constitutional reforms. The adequacy of judicial conduct codes and proposed codes in Morocco is
beyond the scope of this article.
147. See with respect to judicial education in Morocco, BROWN, supra note 63, 8 ("Morocco
has established the National Institute of Judicial Studies which has a mandatory three-year training
period for new judges. The Institute is working to expand its offerings for continuing education for
judicial personnel. All judges trained in recent years are graduates of the National Institute for Judicial
Studies, where they undergo three years of study heavily focused on human rights and the rule of law.").
148. MOROCCo CONST. art. 28. (Editors' translation: Freedom of the press is guaranteed and
cannot be limited by any form of prior censorship. All have the right to express and disseminate
information, ideas and opinions freely, within the limits provided by law, Public authorities shall
support the organization of an independent press on a democratic basis, and also the determination of
legal and ethical rules relating to it. The law sets the rules of organization and controls the means of
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Freedom of the press (including from censorship) is generally
guaranteed by Article 28 of the Moroccan Constitution (La libertd de la
presse est garantie et ne peut &tre limitge par aucune forme de censure
prialable). For the steps toward judicial independence and accountability
to be most meaningful, the press should be encouraged to investigate and
report abuses. Not only should problems, where appropriate, be reported to
deter others, but successes should be reported as positive models for others.
Although allegations of constraints on press freedom as have been
reported in particular instances in Morocco are a matter of concern 1 4 9 (the
new constitutional reforms aside), the press should be especially aggressive
in the area of judicial reform. This may be particularly important when
reporting on corruption.
However, the press should also be certain to play a responsible role,
including in civic education. This may entail explaining that the role of the
judge is to decide according to law and not attacking judges for unpopular
but lawful decisions in pending cases. There is a delicate balance or tension
between judicial independence and excessive public pressure on the
judiciary.so
public communication. It guarantees access to these means, respecting linguistic pluralism and the
cultural and political pluralism of Moroccan society. Pursuant to section 165 of this Constitution, the
High Authority ofAudiovisual Communication oversees this pluralism.)
149. 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: MOROCCO, supra note 85, at 15.
The law generally provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the
government continued to restrict freedom of the press through the legal system.
Government-provided figures for this year showed that six journalists or media
outlets faced criminal or civil charges, down from 56 such cases in 2009 and 42 in
2008. These numbers included cases the government initiated as well as private
citizens' libel complaints. Numerous human rights groups criticized the steady
stream of criminal prosecutions, newspaper closings, and libel suits.
The law prohibits citizens from criticizing Islam or the institution of the
monarchy. It is also illegal to voice opposition to the government's official
position regarding territorial integrity and Western Sahara. The press, however,
reported on controversial and culturally sensitive topics involving the military,
national security, and sexuality.
Id.; see also Loubna Flah, Perils of Journalism in Morocco: Nini Behind Bars, Jamai Out of the
Country and Haftani Abusively Dismissed, MOROCCO WORLD NEWS, (Jan. 9, 2012), available at
http://moroccoworldnews.com/2012/01/perils-of-journalism-in-morocco-nini-behind-bars-jamai-out-of-
the-country-and-hafiani-abusively-suspended/22207 (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) ("The recurrence of
different abuses against journalists remains inimical to the consolidation of democracy in Morocco....
The journalist community adds to the crowd of dissatisfied protesters rejecting cosmetic reforms and
proclaiming its desire for real change.").
150. COMPILATION OF INT'L STANDARDS, supra note 8, at 11, 14 33, 34, citing IBA
Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence (adopted 1982) (observing that judges are not free from
public accountability, but cautions that press needs to be aware of the potential conflict between judicial
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Nonetheless, judicial decisions should not be free from criticism, and
the press should be vigilant in reporting on areas where law reform is
appropriate, both as to the nature of the law and to the implementation or
enforcement of the law.
VIII. ENHANCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A PREDICATE TO MEANINGFUL
JUDICIAL REFORM
ARTICLE 118 of the Moroccan Constitution [Access to justice]
L'acc~s i la justice est garanti ii toute personne pour la
defense de ses droits et de ses intgrits protdgds par la loi.15 1
ARTICLE 121 of the Moroccan Constitution [Access to justice]
Dans les cas oii la loi le privoit, la justice est gratuite pour
ceux qui ne disposent pas de ressources suffisantes pour ester en
justice. 15
Moving toward a fair and impartial judiciary is a benefit in and of
itself, but one must also consider who is left out or lacks access and who
has it. To those who are left out, to what extent does judicial reform create
meaningful change?
The issue of access to justice may be addressed through a case study,
such as through the 2004 Moroccan Personal Status Code reforms, even
though the problems of access and the perception of lack of access in
addition to overall unfairness are more pervasive.153 Although the
independence and excessive pressure on judges; and especially recommends restraint in publishing on
pending cases).
The United States has particular experience with excessive external pressure on judges, including
by politicians. See, e.g., Norman L. Greene, Introduction, "Politicians on Judges: Fair Criticism or
Intimidation, " 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 294 (1997).
151. MOROCCO CONST. art. 118 (Editors' translation: Access to justice is guaranteed to all for
the defense of their rights and legally protected interests.). A broad statement like this raises obvious
questions concerning how it will be implemented, in which cases and with what resources.
152. MOROCCO CONST. art. 121 (Editors' translation: In cases where required by law, justice is
free for those who do not have sufficient resources to litigate.) This general statement likewise raises
the question of implementation, including the amount of resources to be allocated to provide "free
justice," the overall quality of justice to be provided, and the definition of resources in the text of the
law (pas de resources suffisantes), which appears to apply a "means" test. That is, how, by whom and
using what criteria is it determined that sufficient resources are absent?
153. This section is heavily drafted from Norman L. Greene, International Law Weekend Panel
Examines Access to Justice in the Middle East and North Afica Before and After the Arab Spring, 20
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combination of political forces leading to the passage of the reforms is
beyond the scope of this article, scholars have pointed out the involvement
of the monarchy, political parties, parliament, human rights non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), backlash arising from the terrorist
attack in Casablanca in 2003, and the feminist movement, with different
scholars weighting the effect of some of the principal factors differently.15 4
These reforms affected, among other things, rights involving marriage
(including polygamy), divorce, child custody, and inheritance. The
reforms, which have been "[h]ailed as one of the most progressive legal
reforms in the Islamic world, ... elevates the status of women, limits some
rights men had over women, and grants women more affirmative rights in
their affairs."'" It includes a restriction on, but not abolition of,
polygamy' 6 under certain circumstances (including when a wife inserts a
ILSA Q. 20-24 (2011). For the reported low public opinion of access to justice and the judiciary
generally in Morocco based on a 2005 report, see Katie Zoglin, Morocco's Family Code: Improving
Equality for Women, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 964 (2009).
The public lacks confidence in and expresses ambivalence toward the justice
system as a whole. Litigants see the justice system as failing to regulate social
inequalities; the poor view the wealthy and those with connections as receiving
preferential treatment. Young women feel particularly vulnerable and do not
believe that they are treated fairly. Citizens do not have a high opinion of the
judiciary as a general matter. The judiciary is criticized as corrupt, lacking
independence, and inaccessible. Lawyers are often described as motivated by
money.
Id. at 975-76 (footnotes omitted) (citing, among other things, Public Perception of the Moroccan
Judiciary: Findings from Qualitative Research Conducted in July and August 2005, at 11-12 (2005))
(reported as on file with author Katie Zoglin).
154. Extensive literature addresses the political forces leading to the reform of the Moudawana.
See, e.g., Fatima Sadiqi, The Central Role of the Family Law in the Moroccan Feminist Movement,
35(3) BRrr. J. OF MIDDLE E. STUD., 325-37 (Dec. 2008). But see Francesco Cavatorta & Emanuela
Dalmasso, Liberal Outcomes Through Undemocratic Means: The Reform of the Code de Statut
Personnel in Morocco, 47(4) J. OF MODERN AFR. STUD. 487, 500-01 (2009) (noting both the
predominant role of the king in bypassing other political forces-through what amounted to a "top-
down reform"-in order to secure passage of the legislation as well as the positive aspects of the
legislation).
155. Amna Arshad, Itihad as a Tool for Islamic Legal Reform, Advancing Women's Rights
in Morocco, 16 KAN. J. L. PUB. POL'Y 129, 137-38 (2006-2007). Under the 1958 version of the
Moudawana, by way of contrast, "women were dependent on their fathers and husbands throughout
their lives." Id. at 135.
156. See Buskens, Sharia and National Law in Morocco, supra note 36, at 115:
Polygamy has been an important symbol in the struggle for reform of the family
law. For progressives, it has been seen as a sign of inequality, for conservatives
and part of the islamists, a God-given privilege for the man. It is remarkable that
the Moroccan legislator, like legislators in other Arab countries, did not dare to
abolish this practice completely, even though it seldom occurs in practice.
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monogamy clause in her marriage contract) and an increase in the minimum
age for women to marry to eighteen (same as for men), up from the
minimum age of 15, although judges retain discretion to reduce the age
under certain circumstances, and additional reforms as documented in the
literature.'
Access to justice faces substantial obstacles even in the context of
these reforms. These obstacles include lack of knowledge of such rights, as
many women are not trained in or otherwise informed of them, particularly
in rural areas;'18 and patriarchal attitudes among men, including among
some judges (limiting their impartiality), which have led to illiberal
interpretation and enforcement of the law. 5 9 Government and civil society
efforts (including various NGO's) are ongoing to improve acceptance of the
law. 60  In addition, in light of the new anti-discriminatory constitutional
provisions recognizing the equality of men and women, judicial patriarchal
attitudes may well need to be revisited and addressed. See Article 19 of the
See also RACHEL NEWCOMB, supra note 27, at 52-78 (chapter entitled "Mudawana Reform and the
Persistence of Patriarchy," exploring attitudes both for and against continuation of polygamy; book is
based on anthropological fieldwork primarily conducted pre-Moudawana reform). The author observes
inconsistent spellings of Moudawana, although there is no confusion over what is intended.
157. For a detailed description of the reforms to the Moroccan Personal Status Code, see
generally Katja Zvan Elliott, Reforming the Moroccan Personal Status Code: A Revolution for Whom?,
14 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 213 (No. 2, July 2009); Katie Zoglin, Morocco's Family Code: Improving
Equality for Women, supra note 153.
158. See Leila Hanafi, Promoting a Rule of Law Culture in the Middle East and North Africa
Region: Reflections from the MENA Rule of Law Conference 2010 (Al Akhawayn Univ., Ifrane,
Morocco, June 25-26, 2010), available at http://www.mena20lOwjp.org/conference/reflections-from-
the-mena-conference (last visited March 7, 2012) ("[L]egal education should also be about raising legal
literacy and reaching out to the underserved groups, to educate them about the system and to help make
it inclusive and accessible, not only financially, but also procedurally.").
159. See Buskens, supra note 36, at 121 ("Not all Moroccans endorse the new vision according
to which women and children have increased rights, while men are forced to accept stricter obligations.
in fact, the significance of the reforms largely depends on the way in which judges and 'udul apply the
law in practice.... Likewise, it appears that not all judges of the old guard are prepared to apply the
new visions espoused by the most recent version of the Mudawwana."). See also MOROCCO RULE OF
LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 21 ("Some judges and citizens view the law as inconsistent with
Islamic principles or cultural practice, making application of the law problematic.")
160. Id. at 121 ("The Moroccan government has started a widespread campaign to clarify the
vision of the legislator to the judiciary and to thereby promote the application of the law. The Ministry
of Justice organizes courses and meetings all over the country. It has also published an official manual
for the application of the law in practice, which provides for the proper interpretation of articles and
further legitimises their existence in Islamic terms. A French version of this guide has also been
published, and is available on the website of the ministry as well.").
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Moroccan Constitution (establishing equal rights for men and women and
opposing all forms of discrimination).' 6'
The situation limiting full enjoyment of the rights granted by the
Moudawana is exacerbated by high levels of illiteracy among women
(hampering awareness of such rights, especially in rural areas); a lack of
infrastructure (such as roads), making travel to and from remote rural areas
difficult, including by "legal aid and non-profit organizations;"6 and once
again, the effect of patriarchal approaches to the law. The status of
implementation remains fluid as efforts continue by the government and
civil society to overcome long-standing problems.1
In addition, because of the high cost of representation combined with
widespread poverty and insufficient legal services, the right to counsel and
(therefore to justice) has been limited. Extensive court delays have also
been the result of overburdened courts.'64 Delays or backlogs also "lead to
a lack of public confidence in a country's judiciary and to hesitancy to rely
on the judiciary in business planning." 65  Poverty and illiteracy are not
necessarily linked in Morocco as there is widespread unemployment among
161. MOROCCO CONST. art. 19 ("L'homme et la femme jouissent, A 6galit6, des droits et libertds
A caractbre civil, politique, 6conomique, social, culturel et environnemental, 6noncds dans le pr6sent
titre. . . . L'Etat marocain (Euvre A la r6alisation de la parit6 entre les hommes et les femmes. I est
cr66, i cet effet, une Autorit6 pour la parit6 et la lutte contre toutes formes de discrimination.") [Editors'
translation: "Men and women enjoy equal rights and freedoms of a civil, political, economic, social,
cultural and environmental nature as stated in this title.... The Moroccan State works to achieve parity
between men and women. It has created for this purpose a commission to achieve equality and combat
all forms of discrimination."].
162. Leila Hanafi & Christine S. Pratt, Morocco's 2004 Family Code Moudawana: Improving
Access to Justice for Women 18 (publication forthcoming as part of a volume entitled Women and
Knowledge in the Mediterranean Region, Sept. 2010) (placing 2004 reform in historical context). The
authors identify literature written in Arabic and French on women's rights as another problem where the
languages of some women are solely Moroccan Arabic and Berber [Amazigh]. Id. Still other problems
not restricted to the Moudawana reform but affecting its implementation are delays in the courts and
corruption. Id. at 17, 20. See also Norman L. Greene, Morocco: Beyond King's Speech &
Constitutional Reform: An Introduction to Implementing a Vision of an Improved Judiciary in
Morocco, MOROCCO BOARD NEWS SERV. (Apr. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.moroccoboard.com/news/5l76-morocco-beyond-kings-speech-a-constitutional-reform (last
visited Mar. 7,2012).
163. See Fatima Sadiqi, Morocco: Gender at Heart of New Constitution, COMMON GROUND
NEWS SERV. (Sept. 6, 2011), available at http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=
30326&lan=en&sp=0 (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
164. See Schemm, Moroccan justice: sold to highest bidder, supra note 62. See also id. ("To
make matters worse, Morocco's 3,000 judges are inundated by cases they say they barely have time to
handle. In 2007 there were 2.57 million new cases filed and 3.25 million ongoing, according to a 2010
USAID report on the rule of law in Morocco.").
165. DAM, supra note 47, at 104.
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university graduates which has been the subject of ongoing demonstrations
through 2012 by what has been termed an "unemployed graduates"
movement.166
A loss in confidence may also lead some to seek alternatives to courts.
Disputes will need to be resolved one way or another, and even invoking
customary law (or an informal justice system) is another approach to a
traditional judicial system. Such informal and customary systems have
historically played some role in Morocco.66 Alternative dispute resolution,
166. See Paul Silverstein, Weighing Morocco's New Constitution, MIDDLE E. RES. & INFO.
PROJECT (July 5, 2011), available at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero07O5l1 (last visited Mar. 7,
2012):
Ironically, the more educated Moroccans are, the more likely they are to be
jobless. Over the last decade, unemployed university graduates (les diplomas
ch6meurs) have staged weekly demonstrations in front of Parliament calling for
an open job market that does not simply benefit those with family connections.
The graduates' organizational structure, non-violent tactics and militant
experience laid the groundwork for the February 20 movement.
See also Paul Schemm, 5 UneployaMromxam SeSds on Fe ASSOCIATED PRESS, ABC NEWS,
(Jan. 19, 2012), available at http://abcnews.go.com/m/story?id=15392114 (last visited Mar. 7, 2012):
Five unemployed Moroccan men set themselves on fire in the capital Rabat as
part of widespread demonstrations in the country over the lack of jobs,
especially for university graduates, a rights activist said Thursday. Three were
burned badly enough to be hospitalized.
Once rare, self-immolation became a tactic of protest in the Middle East and
North Africa ever since a vegetable seller in Tunisia set himself on fire in
December 2010 to protest police harassment, setting off an uprising that toppled
the government and sparked similar movements elsewhere in the region.
The Moroccans were part of the "unemployed graduates" movement, a loose
collection of associations across the country filled with millions of university
graduates demanding jobs. The demonstrations are often violently dispersed by
police and in some towns and cities have resulted in sustained clashes. While the
official unemployment rate is only 9.1 percent nationally, it rises to around 16
percent for graduates.
See also Paul Schemm, Jobless Moroccan Dies After Setting HimselfAfire, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://thechronicleherald.ca/world/55439-jobless-
moroccan-dies-after-setting-himself-afire (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
167. See, e.g., MOROCCO RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 12:
As a response to these inequalities in the formal justice sector, Moroccans have
historically used various alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods, including
traditional forms of reconciliation performed by tribal chiefs, arbitration carried
out by arbiters selected by parties to the dispute (called amghar or anachram),
and the use of Muslim religious leaders (imams) in civil or family disputes.
Another form of traditional mediation, largely associated with businesses,
involves specially designated individuals from the business community (amine).
These forms of ADR preceded the current judicial system, and even though
dispute referrals to the courts have become more frequent, traditional and local
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such as mediation and arbitration, is another option, 168 but the reason for
selecting such resolution should not be that the courts are dysfunctional, but
rather that it is preferred because of its inherent advantages.
Thus improving access to justice includes diverse subjects, such as
alleviating poverty (more in the domain of development economics);' 69
improving transportation (including to courts); addressing illiteracy (a
major challenge itself for professional educators); and in some cases,
changing culture as well as expanding legal services. Obviously, these are
some of the most troublesome social and economic problems; and although
they may neatly be identified, they are not simple items to resolve. The
combined multi-disciplinary efforts of government, civil society, and
individuals are required, and with respect to government, a commitment to
budget resources for this purpose.
In addition, improving access to justice is of limited benefit if there is
no justice because of corruption or of a lack of fair and impartial courts for
other reasons, in whole or in part. Under those circumstances, efforts may
be spent on improving access, but the purpose of achieving such access-
access to a fair and impartial justice system-is lost.
Finally, it is conceded that it would be neater if top-down legal
reforms handed down by the national government would fix things, if
declaring the importance of judicial independence and impartiality would
bring change about, if anti-corruption laws were self-executing, and if
problems otherwise fit into neat categories susceptible to ready solutions.
Some solutions are long-term, and reasonable patience and persistence are
customary forms of resolution still play a role. ADR is provided for in the law
and while some efforts are being made to try to explore what role it can play, it is
being underutilized.
Cf Buskens, supra note 36, at 130 ("Under the influence of French and Spanish protectorate rule,
state law gained primacy, while Islamic norms and customary law were restricted to a subordinate
position within state law. . . . After independence the government further limited the influence of
Islamic law and virtually denied the existence of customary law by largely excluding it from the official
state system.") (citation omitted).
168. See Leila Hanafi, Improving the Legal Infrastructure in the Middle East and North Africa
through Alternative Dispute Resolution 509-10 (Conf. Paper, UAE Univ., Apr. 23 -25, 2012), available
at http://siconf.uaeu.ac.ae/images/?..,)%2019%20%20lu-o--1-part%204%20E/19.pdf (last visited
Mar. 7, 2012) ("Historically, numerous forms of alternative dispute resolution have been in use in
Morocco.... While recourse to the courts has become increasingly common and frequent in modem
day Morocco, informal networks and local commercial customs continue to play an important role in
commercial dispute resolution."). Id. at 509 ("Morocco showcases how arbitration and mediation are
being used as positive means of resolving disputes and seeking justice remedies."). See also Electronic
Transactions, Research Conference (2012), available at http://slconf.uaeu.ac.ae/19/english-research.asp
(last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (listing all conference papers, including Ms. Hanafi's and others).
169. See WILLIAM EASTERLY, supra note 6; WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
GROWTH (2002).
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required. Nonetheless, given the reported scope of the problems,
impatience in Morocco is understandable.
IX. THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN ENHANCING PUBLIC
CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
We all know there are other countries where, for various
reasons, the public lacks confidence in the judiciary. . . . And
where those things have happened, I think there have been bad
results for the people who live in the country, not just for the
judges, not just for the lawyers, but for the ordinary man and
woman who lives in the country.'7 0 (U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Stephen Breyer)
An important purpose of reform is not only to improve the reality of
impartial justice, but also to enhance the public perception of justice. Public
confidence that judges will act impartially so as to preserve the dignity of
all participants in the Moroccan legal system is essential to the perception
of justice. Even small lapses in isolated cases may jolt public confidence,
and given the widespread news reports, do so for a judicial system already
under severe criticism. It is axiomatic that if the courts are viewed as
corrupt or biased, their use will be avoided, with many attendant negative
consequences, including, as the King has observed, on economic
171 t"e ,12development; and it "feeds into" public "anger and desperation."7
For example, a number of Moroccan and Moroccan-American
colleagues have stressed how concern that the courts will not treat them
fairly keeps them from using them. In some cases, the author was
informed, people are afraid that, because of corruption and other failures by
the courts, they "could go to the police station as a plaintiff and emerge as
the defendant." In other words, one's complaint against another for a crime
may get distorted into retaliation against oneself. People also fear a lack of
fair treatment where their adversary is rich or powerful.173  Under these
circumstances, some ask, why bother with the courts?
170. Television Interview by PBS of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Stephen Breyer and Anthony
Kennedy (1999), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/justice/interviews/
supremo.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (quoting United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer).
171. Accord DAM, supra note 47, at 93-94; see also Perspectives from the Rule of Law, supra
note 13, at 69 (U.S. domestic context).
172. JOSEPH BRAUDE, THE HONORED DEAD 190 (2011) (also observing that such anger and
desperation fuels extremism).
173. See MOROCCO RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 12 ("In general, justice in
Morocco is perceived by the public to be more of a matter of access to power rather [than] the function
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The constitutional reforms are a significant national statement in favor
of a good judicial system for Morocco. The government needs to follow
through on its promises in all their aspects, among other things, through
establishing impartiality, eliminating corruption, and increasing access to
justice, including addressing court delay.1 74  Initial measures to be taken
might include enhanced corruption investigations and prosecutions of those
who would corrupt the judiciary, and for lesser offenses, judicial
disciplinary and disqualification procedures, all with appropriate
protections for witnesses. Particular targets might be telephone justice and
other improper efforts to influence the judge, such as those referenced in
Article 109 of the Moroccan Constitution.
The success of the new reforms in the establishment of fair and
impartial courts, and if so, how long it will take, is unclear. 175 But
implementation of the reforms must become a priority (including a
budgetary priority), combining enforcement, education, and more.
X. CONCLUSION
[N]o degree of improvement in substantive law-even world
"best practice' substantive law-will bring the rule of law to a
country that does not have effective enforcement. A sound
judiciary is key to enforcement. . . . One conclusion widely
agreed upon, not just in the economic literature but also among
lawyers and legal scholars, is therefore that the judiciary is a
vital factor in the rule of law and more broadly in economic
development. 76
of an independent and impartial rule of law system.. . . The public in general lack confidence in and
respect for the judicial system.").
174. Of course, increasing access may have the incidental effect of increased court delays under
certain circumstances. See DAM, supra note 47, at 105 (referencing Brazil, where "unfettered access for
everyone had produced, not surprisingly, access for no one.").
175. By way of comparison, past international proposals for Morocco have projected relatively
long-range proposals for judicial reform, with time horizons varying for some measures of from one to
three years and for others four to ten years; and some past proposals in Morocco have apparently been
inadequate in addressing the problems. Whether those reforms are appropriate are beyond the scope of
this article. See MOROCCO RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 30 et seq. (targeting certain
aspects of justice system reform.) Also, the "Ministry of Justice reportedly initiated a reform effort in
2000" whose objectives included "increasing the number of corruption cases" and assuring "ethical
conduct of the judiciary." Id. at 44. Yet now in 2012, despite the 2000 reform effort and whatever (if
any) effects it had, the issues of corruption and unethical judicial conduct have still merited
constitutional reform and widespread concern over the lack of honest and impartial justice.
176. Dam, supra note 47 at 93.
King Mohammed VI stated a plan to implement his March 2011
speech, well aware that one does not achieve the ideals set forth by
speeches alone. The King's speech mentioned a "comprehensive package"
of constitutional amendments to be proposed and added, "[c]onsistent with
a standard practice of resorting to a participatory approach in all the major
reforms we have introduced so far, I have decided to set up an ad hoc
committee for the revision of the Constitution." 77 In subsequent months,
this in fact occurred, and the constitutional reforms were overwhelmingly
approved by the July 1, 2011 Moroccan referendum, thus avoiding much of
the unrest embroiling other parts of the region during the Arab Spring. 7 8
Although the author's earlier article on this subject observed that the
King's speech focused on a level of detail unlikely to be the subject of
constitutional provisions, those constitutional provisions ultimately were
quite specific in many instances. Such measures and legislation that
follows may help improve Moroccan justice, so long as the government and
the public are committed to their implementation. As the King has
conceded, constitutional reform is only a beginning:
As perfect as it may be, a constitution is never an end in itself,
but rather a means for the establishment of democratic
institutions. The latter require reforms and political overhauling
in which all stakeholders should take part, so as to achieve our
shared ambition, namely to promote development and enable all
our citizens to lead a dignified life. 7 9
Current questions thus include-now that the constitutional reform
implemented the king's speech-what will implement the constitutional
reform? The reform is promising, but not Self-executing.'so
Judicial reform requires a multi-level approach, from increasing
independence to ensuring accountability and freedom from interference.
The goal, if people are so inclined, is to establish an impartial judicial
system, and whether that goal will be obtained or retained in Morocco or
anywhere else, including in the United States, is an ongoing struggle.
Judicial reform is ambitious, but reform sometimes must be bold. To quote
177. His Majesty King Mohammed VI, Speech at Rabat, Morocco, MAP (Mar. 9, 2011),
http://www.map.ma/eng/sections/speeches/hm the-kingaddresse_6/view (last visited Mar. 6,2012).
178. The adequacy of the procedures for developing the constitutional reforms is beyond the
scope of this article.
179. Morocco New Constitution, supra note 141.
180. Silverstein, supra note 28 ("But such a new Morocco does not simply come into being
because 98.5 percent of a possible majority of the electorate votes 'yes' to an eloquent governing
document promulgated by the 'commander of the faithful."').
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Stephen Sondheim from the commencement speech in his musical Merrily
We Roll Along-although the differences between commencement speeches
in Broadway musicals and governing are conceded-boldness is sometimes
the best way: "My final thought is a simple but mighty one: it is the
obligation we have been given. It is to not turn out the same. It is to grow,
to accomplish, to change the world. "181
Finally, protecting and enhancing the judicial branch of government is
well worth the effort on many levels, including because a strong judiciary
also may serve to protect against tyranny, to safeguard human rights, and
otherwise to enhance the rule of law. The Bangalore Principles ofJudicial
Conduct thus observes that "the importance of a competent, independent
and impartial judiciary to the protection of human rights is given emphasis
by the fact that the implementation of all the other rights ultimately depends
upon the proper administration ofjustice." 82
A new federal district court judge in the United States set the tone for
how much judges can do to protect liberty in his induction speech (just after
being sworn in as judge) in November 2011, a speech which bears further
study and repetition. As the judge stated, referencing the famous Federalist
papersl83  leading up to the U.S. Constitution, which observed that "the
judiciary" was "the least dangerous branch [of government]":
[E]nemies of the rule of law have and will continue to find the
judges of this court more than dangerous enough after the horrors
of nineteenth century slavery and twentieth century holocausts.
All civilized men and women of the law now declare that when it
comes to confronting evil, from Auschwitz and Dachau to Darfur
181. Stephen Sondheim, Commencement Speech to the Hills of Tomorrow (Finale) Lyrics,
ALL MUSICALS (2012), available at http://www.allmusicals.com/lyrics/merrilywerollalong/
hillsoftomorrowfinale.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
182. Bangalore Principles ofJudicial Conduct, supra note 7, 1 2.
183. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), available at
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa78.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2012):
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive,
that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary,
from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political
rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure
them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the
community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the
rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The
judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no
active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor
WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
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and Rwanda, never again will the law stand aside in a shameful
silence. And so I have a word of friendly advice for those who
might be tempted to challenge the rule of law: not in this court,
not in our house, not on my watch.18
The judge's speech naturally leads to a question and a challenge to all
countries, including Morocco: If you do not have a fair and impartial
judicial system, who will protect you in difficult times?'8 5 Who, if anyone,
has done so in the past?'86 And if no one does, what happens then?
The new Moroccan constitutional reforms are an important start-and
an opportunity to do more. Additional steps might include more extensive
assessments in Morocco by the Moroccan government, civil society or
others to come up with even more specific recommendations in light of the
reforms. For example, Morocco's Minister of Justice has committed to
organizing a national dialogue working with various stakeholders to
develop judicial reform proposals and presumably seek their
implementation, a commission has been appointed to address the effort, and
184. William F. Kuntz, United States District Judge, Induction Speech for the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Nov. 9, 2011) (copy on file with
the author and the law review). The speech is also available at RUTHFULLY YOURS: THE RIGHT NEWS
FRONT AND CENTER, (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.ruthfullyyours.com/ 2011/l l/15/william-kuntz-ii-
united-states-district-court-judge-please-read-this-inspiring-speech-by-a-great-american/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2012).
185. See, e.g., Alison L. McManus, JADALIYYA, April 26, 2012, http://www.jadaliyya.com/
pages/index/5252/el-haqed examining-moroccos-judicial-reform-in-201 ("Until the monarch's power is
diminished and authority is given to an independent judiciary, political dissent in Morocco remains a
risky undertaking."); Edward Wong, Missing Chinese Lawyer Said to Be in Remote Prison, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 2012, at A9 ("Scholars of China's legal system say security forces are acting with growing
impunity and increasingly do not feel constrained by the law. . . . [Slecurity forces have regularly
detained intellectuals, lawyers, and rights defenders without giving any legal cause for doing so. The
government is now considering revising its criminal procedure law to effectively legalize secret
detentions, the scholars say."). See also Norman L. Greene, International Law Weekend Panel
Examines Access to Justice in the Middle East and North Africa Before and After the Arab Spring, 20
ILSA Q. 22, 22-24 (2011) (referencing, among other things, Morocco's own history of human rights
abuses, leading to the establishment of the 2004-2005 Equity and Reconciliation Commission in
Morocco); Buskens, supra note 36, at 102 ("The first twenty-five years of King Hassan's rule are known
as 'the years of lead'. They were characterized by serious violations of human rights and elimination of
political adversaries.").
186. See James N. Sater, Reforming the Rule of Law in Morocco: Multiple Meanings and
Problematic Realities, 14 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 181, 182 (No. 2, July 2009) ('First, since
independence, the system ofjustice has been an instrument of state power. The large number of serious
human rights abuses that were committed by police and other auxiliary forces especially under Hassan II
remained unchecked by the system ofjustice.").
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the work is underway.' 87  There is reason to believe from past and present
unfolding events that the reform opportunity will be taken, and if not, that
the Moroccan population will be watching closely. 88
187. See, e.g., Souhail Karam, Interview-Morocco Government to Seek Royal Pardon for
Jailed Activists, TRUSTMEDIA (Jan. 5, 2012), available at http://www.trust.org/trustmedia/news/
interview-morocco-govt-to-seek-royal-pardon-for-jailed-activists (last visited Mar. 7, 2012), and
http://www.canada.com/entertainment/Jailed+activists+Morocco+royal+pardons/5952290/story.htm
(last visited Mar. 7, 2012) ("Mustafa Ramid, minister of justice and public freedoms, also said in an
interview he planned to organise a national debate involving judges, the bar and civil society groups to
help draft proposals for the reform of the judiciary."). See also id.:
The judiciary should gain independence, especially from the security apparatus,
under charter reforms crafted last year by the Arab world's longest-serving
monarchy to pre-empt a popular revolt like those that have ended the rule of four
Arab leaders... . As well as being accused of widespread corruption, Morocco's
justice system has a reputation for taking its cue from the authorities, especially
when it comes to verdicts in cases of graft or Islamic militancy. "We should seek
to grant judges all the means . . . to ensure the highest level of integrity," Ramid
said.
With respect to the national debate on the judiciary, see National dialogue on judiciary reform to
last two weeks with visits to courts in 21 cities-Minister, MOROCCO WORLD NEWS, April 6. 2012,
available at http://moroccoworldnews.com/2012/04/34122/national-dialogue-on-judiciary-reform-to-
last-two-weeks-with-visits-to-courts-in-21-cities-minister/:
Ramid told the weekly government council that the national dialogue on the
judiciary reform will proceed through gathering proposals and paying visits to
courts in 21 cities.
Ramid added that the dialogue also includes the holding of workshops and
meetings to examine issues pertaining to the independence of the judiciary, the
facilitation of access to justice, the modernization of the justice administration
and the reinforcement of courts' infrastructure.
See also L'Instance chargie de la reforme de la justice entame ses travaux avec la bindiction
royale [Editors' translation: The Commission responsible for justice reform begins its work with the
royal blessing], PANoRAMARoc, May 9, 2012, available at http://www.panoramaroc.ma/fr/linstance-
chargee-de-la-reforme-de-la-justice-entame-ses-travaux-avec-la-benediction-royale/ (last visited June 4,
2012) (describing justice reform commission members and their affiliations). But see Associated Press,
Morocco's judges demand greater independence, AL ARABIYA NEWS, May 15, 2012, available at
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/05/15/214343.html (last visited May 27. 2012) (demonstration by
Judges' Club in favor of judicial independence; none of the members is appointed to justice reform
commission):
On May 8 [, 2012], the king nominated a 40-person commission to begin the
dialogue on judicial reform. No member of the Judges' Club was named to the
commission.
"It is very good that a discussion has been opened on this difficult question.
But I ask why no one from our association was included in this commission,"
Aziz said to The Associated Press.
See also Youssef Jalili, Dernidre chance pour la reforme de la justice, May II, 2012,
PANORAMAROC, available at http://www.panoramaroc.ma/fr/derniere-chance-pour-la-reforme-de-la-
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Even with the reforms set forth in this article, Morocco may not
magically have a model internationally-renowned judicial system. The goal
is not to use nationally specific models to make the Moroccan judicial
system resemble another's.'89  However, with the implementation of the
reforms in its constitution and otherwise, Morocco may and should advance
towards achieving a better and steadily improving version of its own.' 90
justice-par-youssef-jajili/ [Editors' translation of title: Last chance to reform justice.) (last visited June
4, 2012].
188. With respect to citizen interest in judicial reform, see Siham Ali, Justice Reform Begins in
Morocco: A new government panel aims to protect judicial independence and modernise the courts,
MAGHREBIA, May 20, 2012, available at http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtmll/enGB/
features/awilfeatures/2012/05/20/feature-01 (last visited June 10, 2012):
Citizens are eager to see the government implement its promises. "For years,
we've been hearing about reforms, but no change has taken place," social worker
Chabli Mounia told Magharebia.
"Hopefully this project will work, because people really suffer if they have to
deal with the courts," she said.
"There must be safeguards in place to ensure that the citizen can have
confidence in justice," Mounia added.
With respect to the importance for business of implementing the judicial reforms in the
constitution, see also Interview, Author and Adil Naji, Moroccan-American businessman, who has
businesses in both the United States and Morocco, June 21, 2012 (quoting Mr. Naji):
The struggle for judicial improvement through the constitutional reforms-and
undoubtedly from the coming recommendations to implement them-is essential
for business development in Morocco. For the country to thrive commercially
and prosper financially in the MENA region, many things must change, and some
will take some time to address. But an improved judicial system, such as the
reforms now require, should certainly be one of the first.
189. See also Carolyn A. Dubay, supra note 61 ("This is not to suggest that movement towards
judicial independence in Morocco must resemble the structure of judicial independence adopted in
western democracies.").
190. For a discussion of the need for implementation in addition to general support for the
constitutional reforms among public officials, see Larbi Arbaoui, Mr. Benkirane's Coalition
Government: Intentions Versus Reality, MOROCCO WORLD NEWS, May 4, 2012, available at
http://moroccoworldnews.com/2012/05/38058/mr-benkiranes-coalition-government-intentions-versus-
reality/ (last visited May 4, 2012).
All the ministers of the new government have expressed more than once through
different public media outlets that they are ready to do all that it takes to put the
statements of the new constitution into practice and to abide by its guidelines.
But unfortunately, press releases and good intentions don't make politics. In the
absence of a strategic program and a clear future vision, all that remains is just
talk. Politics is not manufactured by an aura of hopes as it is not based on
aspirations. One swallow doesn't make spring.
See also Moha Ennaji, The Arab Spring in Morocco: Reform Without Regime Change,
QUANTARA DE, Nov. 16, 2011, available at http://en.qantara.de/Reform-without-Regime-
Change/7793c39/index.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012):
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Morocco's various political parties, civil society organisations and media believe
that the new constitution will have far-reaching results, but will take much work
to ensure constitutional changes be implemented effectively and widely. They
have faith that the King will embrace this challenge in consonance with the
February 20 movement's call for the rule of law, the values of citizenship,
freedom, social justice and democracy.
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